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ABSTRACT
Parrondo games with spatial dependence have been studied by Ethier and Lee. More
precisely, they studied Toral’s Parrondo games with N players arranged in a circle. The
players play either game A or game B. In game A, a randomly chosen player wins or loses
one unit according to the toss of a fair coin. In game B, which depends on parameters
p0, p1, p2, p3 ∈ [0, 1], a randomly chosen player wins or loses one unit according to the toss
of a pm-coin, where m ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} depends on the winning or losing status of the player’s
two nearest neighbors. In this dissertation, we study a spatially dependent game A, which
we call game A′, introduced by Xie and others and considered by Ethier and Lee. Noting
that game A′ is fair, we say that the Parrondo effect occurs if game B is losing or fair and
the random mixture C ′ := γA′ + (1 − γ)B [respectively, the nonrandom periodic pattern
C ′ := (A′)rBs] is winning. With p1 = p2 and the parameter space being the unit cube, we
investigate numerically the region in which the Parrondo effect appears. We give sufficient
conditions for the ergodicity of an interacting particle system in {0, 1}Z corresponding to the
random mixture C ′ := γA′+(1−γ)B by applying a theorem of Liggett, and also by means of
“annihilating duality”. We also show that limN→∞ µN(γ,1−γ)′ and limN→∞ µ
N
[r,s]′ exist under
certain conditions, where µN(γ,1−γ)′ denotes the mean profit per turn at equilibrium to the
N players playing the random mixture C ′ := γA′ + (1− γ)B, and µN[r,s]′ denotes the mean
profit per turn at equilibrium to the N players playing the nonrandom periodic pattern
C ′ := (A′)rBs.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Parrondo effect, in which there is a reversal in direction in some system parameter
when two similar dynamics are combined, is the result of an underlying nonlinearity. It was
first described by Spanish physicist J. M. R. Parrondo in 1996 in the context of games of
chance: He showed that it is possible to combine two losing games to produce a winning
one. His motivation was to provide a simplified model of the so-called flashing Brownian
ratchet of Ajdari and Prost [1]. Other versions of Parrondo’s games followed, including
Toral’s [19] spatially dependent games. These games were modified by Xie et al. [21], and
it is the goal of this dissertation to explore the latter games in greater depth than was done
by Ethier and Lee [10].
1.1 Parrondo’s original capital-dependent
games (1996)
The original capital-dependent games of Parrondo were motivated by the flashing Brow-
nian ratchet of Ajdari and Prost [1]. This object is well explained in a figure (and caption)
from Parrondo and Dinis [2]; see Figure 1.1. (An earlier version of this figure is in Faucheux
and others [12].)
Parrondo’s idea was to discretize space and time in the flashing Brownian ratchet,
replacing continuous-time Markov processes by discrete-time Markov chains, which could
be interpreted as cumulative profit in a sequence of games of chance. His games can be
described as follows.





4 . In game A, the player tosses a
1
2 -coin. The rules of game B are more complicated.
In game B, if the player’s current cumulative capital is a multiple of 3, a p0-coin is tossed,
otherwise a p1-coin is tossed. So game B is capital-dependent. In both games, the player
wins one unit with heads and loses one unit with tails. Figure 1.2 explains these rules via
2a diagram.
The player’s cumulative profit from game A behaves as a simple symmetric random
walk in Z. The player’s cumulative profit from game B behaves as an asymmetric random
walk in Z with state-dependent probabilities. These probabilities were chosen to make the
game asymptotically fair. Nevertheless, the random mixture C := 12A +
1
2B (toss a fair
coin to decide which game to play, A or B) is a winning game. (See Figure 1.3.) Moreover,
repeated periodic patterns such as ABB, AAB, and AABB are winning as well (and these
patterns are analogous to the flashing Brownian ratchet). The only exception is the pattern
AB, which is fair. (See Figure 1.4.)
Other forms of Parrondo’s games have been introduced, such as history-dependent games
(Parrondo, Harmer, and Abbott [18]) and multiplayer games (e.g., Dinis and Parrondo [17];
Toral, [19], [20]), but it is Toral’s [19] spatially dependent games that we want to focus on.
1.2 Toral’s (2001) spatially dependent games
Toral [19] introduced what he called cooperative Parrondo games with spatial depen-
dence. (We prefer the term spatially dependent Parrondo games so as to avoid conflict with
the field of cooperative game theory.) The games depend on an integer parameterN ≥ 3, the
number of players, and four probability parameters, p0, p1, p2, p3. The players are arranged
in a circle and labeled from 1 to N (so that players 1 and N are nearest neighbors). At
each turn, a player is chosen at random to play. Suppose player x is chosen. In game A, he
tosses a fair coin. In game B, he tosses a pm-coin (i.e., a coin whose probability of heads
is pm), where m ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} depends on the winning or losing status of his two nearest




0 if x− 1 and x+ 1 are both losers,
1 if x− 1 is a loser and x+ 1 is a winner,
2 if x− 1 is a winner and x+ 1 is a loser,
3 if x− 1 and x+ 1 are both winners,
where N + 1 := 1 and 0 := N because of the circular arrangement of players. Player x wins
one unit with heads and loses one unit with tails. See Figure 1.5 for clarification.
These games have been studied in detail in a series of papers by Ethier and Lee ([6],
[7], [8], [9]). For example, with Toral’s [19] choice of parameters, namely (p0, p1, p2, p3) =
3(1, 0.16, 0.16, 0.7), we can compute the asymptotic profit per turn to the set of N players,
for 3 ≤ N ≤ 19. See Table 1.1. In most cases the Parrondo effect (two fair or losing games
combine to win) is present. In the cited papers, a strong law of large numbers and a central
limit theorem are obtained. In particular, the asymptotic cumulative profits per turn exist
and are the means in the SLLN (see Table 1.1). Further, it seems clear that these means
converges as N → ∞. This has been proved under certain conditions (see Ethier and Lee
[8]).
1.3 The spatially dependent games of
Xie and Others (2011)
Notice that Toral’s [19] game A is not spatially dependent (the coin tossed does not
depend on the status of the nearest neighbors). Xie and others. [21] proposed a modification
of game A that is spatially dependent as well as being a fair game. To distinguish, we call
that game A′. The games depend on an integer parameter N ≥ 3, the number of players,
and four probability parameters, p0, p1, p2, p3. The players are arranged in a circle and
labeled from 1 to N (so that players 1 and N are nearest neighbors). At each turn, a player
is chosen at random to play. Suppose player x is chosen. In game A′, he chooses one of his
two nearest neighbors at random and competes with that neighbor by tossing a fair coin.
The results is a transfer of one unit from one of the players to the other, hence the wealth
of the set of N players is unchanged. In game B, he tosses a pm-coin (i.e., a coin whose
probability of heads is pm), where m depends on the status of his nearest neighbors. A




0 if x− 1 and x+ 1 are both losers,
1 if x− 1 is a loser and x+ 1 is a winner,
2 if x− 1 is a winner and x+ 1 is a loser,
3 if x− 1 and x+ 1 are both winners,
where N + 1 := 1 and 0 := N because of the circular arrangement of players. Player x wins
one unit with heads and loses one unit with tails. See Figure 1.6 for clarification.
These games were studied by Xie and others [21] and Ethier and Lee [10]. Only the
random mixture case was treated, and convergence of the means has not yet been addressed.
Our aim in this thesis is to fill in these gaps in the literature. Further, we want to understand
4this model as well as Toral’s model is understood.
We begin by establishing a strong law of large numbers and a central limit theorem,
especially in the periodic pattern case, in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, we compute various
means numerically and use computer graphics to visualize the Parrondo region. Then
we address the issue of convergence of means, which involves certain interacting particle
systems. We establish ergodicity of the interacting particle systems in Chapter 4 under
certain conditions, and we extend this in Chapter 5 using “annihilating duality.” Chapter
6 then proves the convergence, both in the random mixture setting and in the periodic
pattern setting.
5theory for the price of a stock very similar to Einstein’s [14].
Recently this link between probability, statistical mechanics
and economics has crystallized in a new field: econophysics
[15].
Some of the aforementioned constructive role of noise
has been observed in complex systems beyond physics.
Stochastic resonance, for instance, has an increasing
relevance in the study of perception and other cognitive
processes [10, 16]. Similarly, we expect that other elemen-
tary stochastic phenomena such as rectification will be
observed in many situations not restricted to physics.
With this idea in mind, Parrondo’s paradox came up as a
translation to simple gambling games of a Brownian
ratchet discovered by Ajdari and Prost [4]. The ratchet
was afterwards named by Astumian and Bier the flashing
ratchet [6] and it was related to the idea proposed by
Magnasco [5] that biological systems could rectify fluctua-
tions to perform work and systematic motion.
The paradox does not make use of Brownian particles,
but only of the simpler fluctuations arising in a gambling
game. However, it illustrates the mechanism of rectification
in a very sharp way, and for this reason we think that it
could contribute to extend the ‘noisy revolution’, i.e. the
idea that noise can create order, to those fields where
stochastic dynamics is relevant.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briefly
review the flashing ratchet and explain how it can rectify
fluctuations. Section 3 is devoted to the original Parrondo’s
paradox. There we introduce the paradoxical games as a
discretization of the flashing ratchet, discuss an intuitive
explanation of the paradox that we have called reorganiza-
tion of trends, and present an extension of the original
paradox inspired by this idea. In section 4 we introduce
several versions of the games involving a large number of
players. Some interesting eﬀects can be observed in these
collective games: redistribution of capital brings wealth
[17], and collective decisions taken by voting or by
optimizing the returns in the next turn can lead to worse
performance than purely random choices [18, 19]. Finally,
in section 5 we briefly review the literature on the paradox
and present our main conclusions.
2. Ratchets
Here we revisit the flashing ratchet [4, 6], one of the
simplest Brownian ratchets and the most closely related to
the paradoxical games. We refer to the exhaustive review by
Reimann on Brownian ratchets [7] or the special issue in
Applied Physics A, edited by Linke [8], for further
information on the subject.
Consider an ensemble of independent one-dimensional
Brownian particles in the asymmetric sawtooth potential
depicted in figure 1. It is not diﬃcult to show that, if the
potential is switched on and oﬀ periodically, the particles
exhibit an average motion to the right. Let us assume that
the temperature T is low enough to ensure that kT is much
smaller than the maxima of the potential, and that we start
with the potential switched on and with all the particles
around one of its minima, as shown in the upper plot of
figure 1. When the potential is switched oﬀ, the particles
diﬀuse freely, and the density of particles spreads as
depicted in the central plot of the figure. If the potential
is then switched on again, each particle will move back to
the initial minimum or to one of the nearest neighbouring
minima, depending on its position. Particles within the dark
region will move to the right-hand minimum, those within
the small grey region will move to the left-hand minimum,
and those within the white region will move back to their
initial positions. As is apparent from the figure and due to
the asymmetry of the potential, more particles fall into the
right-hand minimum and thus there is a net motion of
particles to the right. For this to occur, the switching can be
either random or periodic, but the average period must be
of the order of the time to reach the nearest barrier by free
diﬀusion (see [4, 6] for details).
This motion can be seen as a rectification of the thermal
noise associated with free diﬀusion. The diﬀusion is
symmetric: some particles move to the right and some to
the left, but their average position does not change.
However, when the potential is switched on again, most
Figure 1. The flashing ratchet at work. The figure represents
three snapshots of the potential and the density of particles.
Initially (upper figure), the potential is on and all the particles
are located around one of the minima of the potential. Then the
potential is switched oﬀ and the particles diﬀuse freely, as shown
in the centred figure, which is a snapshot of the system
immediately before the potential is switched on again. Once
the potential is connected again, the particles in the darker
region move to the right-hand minimum whereas those within the
small grey region move to the left. Due to the asymmetry of the
potential, the ensemble of particles move, on average, to the
right.
148 J. M. R. Parrondo and L. Dinı´s
Figure 1.1. The flashing ratchet at work. The figure represents three snapshots of the
potential and the density of particles. Initially (upper figure), the potential is on and all
the particles are located around one of the minima of the potential. Then the potential
is switched off and the particles diffuse freely, as shown in the centred figure, which is
a snapshot of the system immediately before the potential is switched on again. Once
the potential is connected again, the particles in the darker region move to the right-hand
minimum whereas those within the small grey region mov to the left. Due to the asymmetry
of the potential, the ens mble f particles move, on averag , to the right. (Figure and caption
used by permissi n from Parrondo and Dinis, 2004 [17].)
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p0 1− p0 p1 1− p1
Figure 1.2. Parrondo’s capital-dependent games without a bias parameter.
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Figure 1.4. Cumulative expected profit from Parrondo’s capital-dependent games, cont.
9game A game B
choose a player, say x, at random
?
choose a player, say x, at random
?
x tosses a fair coin
?
check status of players x− 1, x+ 1
• loser, loser: x tosses a p0-coin
• loser, winner: x tosses a p1-coin
• winner, loser: x tosses a p2-coin




























x wins 1 x loses 1
heads tails
heads tails
Figure 1.5. Toral’s spatially dependent, or cooperative, Parrondo games, with parameters
N ≥ 3 and p0, p1, p2, p3 ∈ [0, 1]. (A player’s status as winner or loser depends on the result
of his most recent game. Players are labeled from 1 to N ; player 0 is player N and player
N + 1 is player 1. A p-coin is one for which the probability of heads is p.)
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Table 1.1. Means for Toral’s (2001) games, assuming (p0, p1, p2, p3) = (1, 0.16, 0.16, 0.7).




2B, C := AB, C := ABB, C := ABBB, C := AAB,
C := AABB, and C := AAAB to six significant digits (in most cases) for 3 ≤ N ≤ 18.
Notice that µB < 0 for 3 ≤ N ≤ 19 except for N = 4, 7, 8, so the Parrondo effect is present
except in 26 of the 113 (= 16 × 7 + 1) cases. The seven blank entries were not computed.
The N =∞ row gives the limits as N →∞. (Used by permission from Ethier and Lee [6],
[7].)
N µB µ(A+B)/2 µAB µABB µABBB µAAB µAABB µAAAB
3 −0.0909091 −0.0183774 −0.00695879 −0.0274821 −0.0402157 0.00067249 −0.0148718 0.00179203
4 0.0799608 0.0171357 0.00877041 0.0234583 0.0356946 0.00352220 0.0101194 0.00244238
5 −0.00219465 0.00405176 0.00466232 0.00501198 0.00434917 0.00320648 0.00465517 0.00240873
6 −0.0189247 0.00463310 0.00497503 0.00590528 0.00513509 0.00325099 0.00498178 0.00241857
7 0.00350598 0.00482261 0.00496767 0.00621483 0.00637676 0.00326314 0.00497331 0.00242540
8 0.000698188 0.00479021 0.00494802 0.00604194 0.00599064 0.00327193 0.00495138 0.00243115
9 −0.00189233 0.00479036 0.00493507 0.00598135 0.00588386 0.00327802 0.00493728 0.00243582
10 −0.000332809 0.00479099 0.00492347 0.00593756 0.00584200 0.00328237 0.00492494 0.00243961
11 −0.000466527 0.00479089 0.00491339 0.00589846 0.00578690 0.00328558 0.00491438 0.00244272
12 −0.000676916 0.00479089 0.00490464 0.00586697 0.00574489 0.00328800 0.00490531 0.00244529
13 −0.000562901 0.00479089 0.00489699 0.00584063 0.00571065 0.00328986 0.00489744 0.00244745
14 −0.000569340 0.00479089 0.00489026 0.00581820 0.00568131 0.00329133 0.00489056 0.00244927
15 −0.000586184 0.00479089 0.00488431 0.00579891 0.00565623 0.00329249 0.00488449 0.00245083
16 −0.000578161 0.00479089 0.00487900 0.00578213 0.00563452 0.00329343 0.00487912 0.00245217
17 −0.000578345 0.00479089 0.00487426 0.00576740 0.00561552 0.00329420 0.00487432 0.00245334
18 −0.000579652 0.00479089 0.00486999 0.00575438 0.00559876 0.00329483 0.00487001 0.00245437
19 −0.000579095 0.00479089
∞ 0.00479089 0.00479089 0.00554084 0.00532972 0.00329853 0.00479089 0.00246903
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game A′ game B
choose a player, say x, at random
?
choose a player, say x, at random
?
choose y from x’s nearest neighbors at random
? ?
check status of players x− 1, x+ 1
• loser, loser: x tosses a p0-coin
• loser, winner: x tosses a p1-coin
• winner, loser: x tosses a p2-coin
• winner, winner: x tosses a p3-coin




























x wins 1 x loses 1
heads tails
Figure 1.6. Satially dependent, or cooperative, Parrondo games of Xie and others [21],
with parameters N ≥ 3 and p0, p1, p2, p3 ∈ [0, 1]. (A player’s status as winner or loser
depends on the result of his most recent game. Players are labeled from 1 to N ; player 0 is
player N and player N + 1 is player 1. A p-coin is one for which the probability of heads is
p.)
CHAPTER 2
SLLN/CLT FOR THE GAMES OF
XIE AND OTHERS
In this chapter, we restate the strong law of large numbers (SLLN) and the central limit
theorem (CLT) of Ethier and Lee [5], and we apply them to the Parrondo games of Xie and
others. [21].
2.1 SLLN and CLT of Ethier and Lee
Ethier and Lee [5] proved an SLLN and a CLT for the Parrondo player’s sequence of
profits, motivated by game B and the random mixture C := γA+ (1− γ)B. A subsequent
version, stated later, treats the case of periodic patterns.
Consider an irreducible aperiodic Markov chain {Xn}n≥0 with finite state space Σ0.
It evolves according to the one-step transition matrix P = (Pij)i,j∈Σ0 . Let us denote its
unique stationary distribution by the row vector pi = (pii)i∈Σ0 . Let w : Σ0 × Σ0 7→ R be
an arbitrary function, which we write as a matrix W = (w(i, j))i,j∈Σ0 and refer to as the
payoff matrix. Define the sequences {ξn}n≥1 and {Sn}n≥1 by
ξn := w(Xn−1, Xn), n ≥ 1, (2.1)
and
Sn := ξ1 + · · ·+ ξn, n ≥ 1. (2.2)
Let Π denote the square matrix each of whose rows is pi, and let Z := (I − (P −Π))−1
denote the fundamental matrix. Denote by P˙ and P¨ the Hadamard (entrywise) products
P ◦W and P ◦W ◦W (so P˙ij := Pijw(i, j) and P¨ij := Pijw(i, j)2). Let 1 := (1, 1, . . . , 1)T
and define
µ := piP˙1 and σ2 := piP¨1− (piP˙1)2 + 2piP˙ (Z −Π)P˙1. (2.3)
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If µ = 0 and σ2 > 0, then −∞ = lim infn→∞ Sn < lim supn→∞ Sn =∞ a.s.
To illustrate this theorem, let us consider the capital-dependent Parrondo games of
Section 1.1. The underlying Markov chain {Xn}n≥0 has state space Σ0 := {0, 1, 2} and
one-step transition matrix
PB :=
 0 1/10 9/101/4 0 3/4
3/4 1/4 0
 .
Its unique stationary distribution is piB = (1/13)(5, 2, 6). The payoff matrix has the form
W :=




µB = piBP˙B1 = 0.
We can apply the same argument to
PA :=
 0 1/2 1/21/2 0 1/2
1/2 1/2 0

with unique stationary distribution piA = (1/3)(1, 1, 1) to get
µA = piAP˙A1 = 0,
a result that is obvious without calculation. Finally, the (12 ,
1





(PA + PB) =
 0 3/10 7/103/8 0 5/8
5/8 3/8 0

with unique stationary distribution piC = (1/709)(245, 180, 284). We get




This is perhaps the best known example of Parrondo’s paradox, and the SLLN justifies the
conclusion: Two fair games combine to win.
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We can also derive a CLT, which requires the fundamental matrix
ZB := (I − (PB −ΠB))−1 = 1
2197











ZA := (I − (PA −ΠA))−1 = 1
9




σ2A = piAP¨A1− (piAP˙A1)2 + 2piAP˙A(ZA −ΠA)P˙A1 = 1,
as is obvious without the formula. Finally,
ZC := (I − (PC −ΠC))−1 = 1
502681
392265 22884 8753223585 408580 70516
80305 39900 382476
 ,
and we conclude that




In each case we have a CLT.
Next we turn to another SLLN and CLT of Ethier and Lee [5] , this one motivated by
the case of periodic patterns.
Let PA and PB be one-step transition matrices for Markov chains in a finite state space
Σ0. Fix integers r, s ≥ 1. Assume that P := P rAP sB, as well as all cyclic permutations of
P rAP
s
B, are ergodic, and let the row vector pi be the unique stationary distribution of P . Let
Π be the square matrix each of whose rows is equal to pi, and let Z := (I − (P −Π))−1 be
the fundamental matrix of P . Given a real-valued function w on Σ0×Σ0, define the payoff
matrix W := (w(i, j))i,j∈Σ0 . Define P˙A := PA ◦W , P˙B := PB ◦W , P¨A := PA ◦W ◦W ,

























































































B (Z −Π)P rAP vBP˙B1
)]
,
where 1 denotes a column vector of 1s with entries indexed by Σ0. Let {Xn}n≥0 be a non-
homogeneous Markov chain in Σ0 with one-step transition matrices PA, . . . ,PA (r times),
PB, . . . ,PB (s times), PA, . . . ,PA (r times), PB, . . . ,PB (s times), and so on. For each
n ≥ 1, define ξn := w(Xn−1, Xn) and Sn := ξ1 + · · ·+ ξn.





and, if σ2[r,s] > 0, then
Sn − nµ[r,s]√
nσ2[r,s]
→d N(0, 1) as n→∞.
To illustrate this result, we consider the capital-dependent Parrondo games of Section
1.1, and we take r = s = 2. Then





162 59 99151 58 111
111 47 162
 .






569627023 10027235 −5430542122416463 532826915 −29894541
−58953137 −14383645 598685619
 .
In this example, P˙A1 = 0, P¨A = PA, and P¨B = PB, and this simplfies the mean and










2 + 2− (piP 2AP˙B1)2 − (piP 2APBP˙B1)2
+ 2piP˙A(PA −ΠP 2A)(I + PB)P˙B1 + 2piPAP˙A(I −ΠP 2A)(I + PB)P˙B1
+ 2piP 2AP˙B(I −ΠP 2APB)P˙B1
+ 2piP˙APAP
2
B(Z −Π)P 2A(I + PB)P˙B1 + 2piPAP˙AP 2B(Z −Π)P 2A(I + PB)P˙B1











These numbers are consistent with Ethier and Lee [5].
2.2 Application to game B
The Markov chain formalized by Mihailovic´ and Rajkovic´ [16] keeps track of the status
(loser or winner, 0 or 1) of each of the N ≥ 3 players of game B, which was described in
Chapter 1. Its state space is the product space
Σ := {η = (η(1), η(2), . . . , η(N)) : η(x) ∈ {0, 1} for x = 1, . . . , N} = {0, 1}N
with 2N states. Let mx(η) := 2η(x−1)+η(x+1) ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Of course η(0) := η(N) and
η(N+1) := η(1) because of the circular arrangement of players. Also, let ηx be the element of
Σ equal to η except at the xth coordinate. For example, η1 := (1−η(1), η(2), η(3), . . . , η(N)).
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The one-step transition matrix PB for this Markov chain depends not only on N but on
four parameters, p0, p1, p2, p3 ∈ [0, 1]. It has the form
PB(η, ηx) :=
{
N−1pmx(η) if η(x) = 0,
N−1qmx(η) if η(x) = 1,
x = 1, . . . , N, η ∈ Σ, (2.4)
and









, η ∈ Σ, (2.5)
where qm := 1−pm for m = 0, 1, 2, 3, and empty sums are 0. The Markov chain is irreducible
and aperiodic if 0 < pm < 1 for m = 0, 1, 2, 3. Under slightly weaker assumptions (see Ethier
and Lee [8]), the Markov chain is ergodic, which suffices. For example, if p0 is arbitrary
and 0 < pm < 1 for m = 1, 2, 3, or if 0 < pm < 1 for m = 0, 1, 2 and p3 is arbitrary, then
ergodicity holds.
It appears at first glance that the theorem does not apply in the context of game B
because the payoffs are not completely specified by the one-step transitions of the Markov
chain. Specifically, a transition from a state η to itself results whenever a loser loses or a
winner wins, so the transition does not determine the payoff.
Our original Markov chain has state space Σ := {0, 1}N and its one-step transition
matrix PB is given by (2.4) and (2.5). Assuming it is ergodic, let pi denote its unique
stationary distribution. The approach in Ethier and Lee [6] augments the state space,
letting Σ∗ := Σ × {1, 2, . . . , N} and keeping track not only of the status of each player as
described by η ∈ Σ but also of the label of the next player to play, say x. The new one-step
transition matrix P ∗B has the form
P ∗B((η, x), (ηx, y)) :=
{
N−1pmx(η) if η(x) = 0,
N−1qmx(η) if η(x) = 1,
(η, x) ∈ Σ∗, y = 1, 2, . . . , N,
and
P ∗B((η, x), (η, y)) :=
{
N−1qmx(η) if η(x) = 0,
N−1pmx(η) if η(x) = 1,
(η, x) ∈ Σ∗, y = 1, 2, . . . , N,
where qm := 1 − pm for m = 0, 1, 2, 3 and mx(η) := 2η(x − 1) + η(x + 1). This remains
an ergodic Markov chain, and its unique stationary distribution pi∗ is given by pi∗(η, x) =
N−1pi(η). Further, the payoff matrix now has each nonzero entry equal to ±1, so the
theorem applies.
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However, there is a drawback to this approach, namely that it is not clear that the
variance parameter (σ∗)2 is the same as the original one, σ2. (It is easy to verify that
µ∗ = µ.) Therefore, we take a different approach, namely the one used by Ethier and Lee
[11] in their study of two-dimensional spatial models.
Here a different augmentation of Σ is more effective. We let Σ◦ := Σ×{−1, 1} and keep
track not only of η ∈ Σ but also of the profit from the last game played, say s ∈ {−1, 1}.
The new one-step transition matrix P ◦B has the form, for every (η, s) ∈ Σ◦,
P ◦B((η, s), (ηx, 1)) :=
{
N−1pmx(η) if η(x) = 0,
0 if η(x) = 1,
(2.6)
P ◦B((η, s), (ηx,−1)) :=
{
0 if η(x) = 0,
N−1qmx(η) if η(x) = 1,
(2.7)
for x = 1, . . . , N , and








where qm := 1 − pm for m = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and mx(η) = 2η(x − 1) + η(x + 1). There are
two inaccessible states, (0, 1) and (1,−1), but the Markov chain remains ergodic. Let pi◦
denote the unique stationary distribution, which has entry 0 at each of the two inaccessible
states. The payoff function w◦ can now be defined by
w◦((η, s), (ηx, t)) = t if η(x) = (1− t)/2, w◦((η, s), (η, t)) = t
for all (η, s) ∈ Σ◦, x = 1, 2, . . . , N , and t ∈ {−1, 1}, and w◦ = 0 otherwise. This allows us to
define the matrix W ◦ and then P˙ ◦B := P
◦
B ◦W ◦ and P¨ ◦B := P ◦B ◦W ◦ ◦W ◦, the Hadamard
(or entrywise) products. Theorem 2.1 yields the following.
Theorem 2.3. Let 0 < pm < 1 for m = 0, 1, 2 or for m = 1, 2, 3, so that the Markov
chain with one-step transition matrix P ◦B is ergodic, and let the row vector pi
◦











B1− (pi◦BP˙ ◦B1)2 + 2pi◦BP˙ ◦B(Z◦B − 1pi◦B)P˙ ◦B1.
where 1 denotes a column vector of 1s with entries indexed by Σ◦B and Z
◦
B := (I − (P ◦B −
1pi◦B))
−1 is the fundamental matrix. (Notice that 1pi◦B is the square matrix each of whose
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rows is equal to pi◦B.) Let {X◦n}n≥0 be a time-homogeneous Markov chain in Σ◦ with one-step
transition matrix P ◦B, and let the initial distribution be arbitrary. For each n ≥ 1, define
ξn := w
◦(X◦n−1, X◦n) and Sn := ξ1 + · · · + ξn. Then limn→∞ n−1Sn = µ◦B a.s. and, if
(σ◦B)
2 > 0, then (Sn − nµ◦B)/
√
n(σ◦B)2 →d N(0, 1) as n→∞.
We next show that there is a simpler expression for this mean and variance. Let us
define
µB := piBP˙B1, σ
2
B := piBP¨B1− (piBP˙B1)2 + 2piBP˙B(ZB − 1piB)P˙B1, (2.10)
where 1 is the column vector of 1s of the appropriate dimension, P˙B is PB with each qm
replaced by −qm, and P¨B = PB. This “rule of thumb” for P˙B requires some caution: It
must be applied before any simplifications to PB are made using qm = 1− pm. Of course,
piB is the unique stationary distribution, and ZB is the fundamental matrix, of PB.
Theorem 2.4.
µ◦B = µB (2.11)
and
(σ◦B)
2 = σ2B. (2.12)
Remark. Before proving this, let us explain its significance. µ◦B and (σ
◦
B)
2 are the mean
and variance that appear in the SLLN and the CLT. They are defined in terms of P ◦B, the
augmented one-step transition matrix. µB and σ
2
B are defined analogously in terms of PB,
the original one-step transition matrix, using the rule of thumb.
Proof. To emphasize the fact that P ◦B((η, s), (ζ, t)) does not depend on s, we write it










B((η, ·), (ζ, t)) =
∑
η,ζ
piB(η)P˙B(η, ζ) = piBP˙B1 = µB.
(2.13)
To show that (σ◦B)





B − 1pi◦B)P˙ ◦B1 = piBP˙B(ZB − 1piB)P˙B1.



















m−1P˙ ◦B1 = piBP˙BP
m−1
B P˙B1, m ≥ 1.




























which completes the proof.
2.3 Application to game C ′ := γA′ + (1− γ)B
This case is not much different from the previous one. Notice that, if game A′ is played,
the profit to the set of N players is 0, since game A′ simply redistributes capital among
the players. So we can use the same augmentation of the state space as before, except
that 0 is now a possible value of the profit from the last game played. In other words,
Σ◦ := Σ×{−1, 0, 1}. The transition probabilities require some new notation. Let ηx,x±1,±1
be the element of Σ representing the players’ status after player x plays player x±1 and wins
(1) or loses (−1). Of course player 0 in player N and player N + 1 is player 1. For example,
η1,2,−1 = (0, 1, η(3), . . . , η(N)) (player 1 competes against player 2 and loses, leaving player
1 a loser and player 2 a winner, regardless of their previous status). Then
P ◦C′((η, s), (ηx, 1)) =
{
(1− γ)N−1pmx(η) if η(x) = 0,
0 if η(x) = 1,
(2.14)
P ◦C′((η, s), (ηx,−1)) =
{
0 if η(x) = 0,
(1− γ)N−1qmx(η) if η(x) = 1,
(2.15)
P ◦C′((η, s), (η
x,x−1,−1, 0)) = γ(4N)−1, (2.16)
P ◦C′((η, s), (η
x,x−1,1, 0)) = γ(4N)−1, (2.17)
P ◦C′((η, s), (η
x,x+1,−1, 0)) = γ(4N)−1, (2.18)
P ◦C′((η, s), (η
x,x+1,1, 0)) = γ(4N)−1, (2.19)
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for x = 1, 2, . . . , N , and








Of course, we could also define PC′ = γPA′ + (1− γ)PB. We notice that Theorems 2.5
and 2.6 hold in this framework without change.
Theorem 2.5. Let 0 < pm < 1 for m = 0, 1, 2 or for m = 1, 2, 3, so that the Markov chain
with one-step transition matrix P ◦C′ := γP
◦
A′ + (1− γ)P ◦B is ergodic, and let the row vector










C′1− (pi◦C′P˙ ◦C′1)2 + 2pi◦C′P˙ ◦C′(Z◦C′ − 1pi◦C′)P˙ ◦C′1.
where 1 denotes a column vector of 1s with entries indexed by Σ◦ and Z◦C′ := (I − (P ◦C′ −
1pi◦C′))
−1 is the fundamental matrix. (Notice that 1pi◦C′ is the square matrix each of whose
rows is equal to pi◦C′.) Let {X◦n}n≥0 be a time-homogeneous Markov chain in Σ◦ with one-step
transition matrix P ◦C′, and let the initial distribution be arbitrary. For each n ≥ 1, define
ξn := w
◦(X◦n−1, X◦n) and Sn := ξ1 + · · · + ξn. Then limn→∞ n−1Sn = µ◦(γ,1−γ)′ a.s. and, if
(σ◦(γ,1−γ)′)
2 > 0, then (Sn − nµ◦(γ,1−γ)′)/
√
n(σ◦(γ,1−γ)′)
2 →d N(0, 1) as n→∞.
Let us define
µ(γ,1−γ)′ := piC′P˙C′1, σ2(γ,1−γ)′ := piC′P¨C′1− (piC′P˙C′1)2 + 2piC′P˙C′(ZC′ − 1piC′)P˙C′1,
(2.22)
where 1 is the column vector of 1s of the appropriate dimension, P˙C′ is (1−γ)P˙B with each
qm replaced by −qm, and P¨C′ = (1 − γ)PB. This “rule of thumb” for P˙C′ requires some
caution: It must be applied before any simplifications to PC′ are made using qm = 1− pm.
Of course, piC′ is the unique stationary distribution, and ZC′ is the fundamental matrix, of
PC′ . Notice that P˙
◦
A′ = 0, so P˙
◦
C′ = (1− γ)P˙ ◦B and P¨ ◦C′ = (1− γ)P¨ ◦B.
Theorem 2.6.
µ◦(γ,1−γ)′ = µ(γ,1−γ)′ (2.23)
and
(σ◦(γ,1−γ)′)
2 = σ2(γ,1−γ)′ . (2.24)
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2.4 Application to game C ′ := (A′)rBs
Next we need versions of the SLLN and the CLT suited to game C ′ := (A′)rBs. The
key result is Theorem 2.2.
For the same reason as before, the theorem does not apply directly to PA′ and PB.
Therefore, we again consider the Markov chains in the augmented state space Σ◦ := Σ ×
{−1, 0, 1} with one-step transition matrix P ◦A′ and P ◦B. The definitions are as in (2.14)–
(2.21) with γ = 1 or γ = 0. With W ◦ as before, the theorem applies.
Fix r, s ≥ 1. Assume that P ◦ := (P ◦A′)r(P ◦B)s, as well as all cyclic permutations of
(P ◦A′)
r(P ◦B)
s, are ergodic, and let the row vector pi◦ be the unique stationary distribution








































s−u−1(Z◦ − 1pi◦)(P ◦A′)r(P ◦B)vP˙ ◦B1
]
.
Let {X◦n}n≥0 be a temporally nonhomogeneous Markov chain in Σ◦ with one-step transition
matrices P ◦A′ , . . . ,P
◦
A′ (r times), P
◦
B, . . . ,P
◦
B (s times), P
◦
A′ , . . . ,P
◦
A′ (r times), P
◦
B, . . . ,P
◦
B
(s times), and so on. For each n ≥ 1, define ξn := w◦(X◦n−1, X◦n) and Sn := ξ1 + · · ·+ ξn.









→d N(0, 1) as n→∞.
Again there are simpler expressions for this mean and variance. We define µ[r,s]′ in terms
of pi, PA′ , PB, and P˙B in the same way that µ
◦
[r,s]′ was defined in terms of pi
◦, P ◦A′ , P
◦
B, and
P˙ ◦B. (P˙B is defined by the rule of thumb.) Finally, σ
2






µ◦[r,s]′ = µ[r,s]′ (2.25)
and
(σ◦[r,s]′)
2 = σ2[r,s]′ . (2.26)
Proof. Eq. (2.25) follows exactly as in (2.13). Eq. (2.26) is proved in the same way as (2.24).
CHAPTER 3
NUMERICAL COMPUTATIONS
In this chapter, we compute vairious means numerically by using the reduced state space
and use computer graphics to visualize the Parrondo region of the Parrondo games of Xie
at al.
3.1 State-space reduction
Let us begin by explaining what we mean by state-space reduction, which is an important
method for simplifying our computations.
In general, consider an equivalence relation ∼ on a finite set E. By definition, ∼ is
reflexive (x ∼ x), symmetric (x ∼ y implies y ∼ x), and transitive (x ∼ y and y ∼ z
imply x ∼ z). It is well known that an equivalence relation partitions the set E into
equivalence classes. The set of all equivalence classes, called the quotient set, will be denoted
by E¯. Let us write [x] := {y ∈ E : y ∼ x} for the equivalence class containing x. Then
E¯ = {[x] : x ∈ E}.
Now suppose X0, X1, X2, . . . is a (time-homogeneous) Markov chain in E with transition
matrix P . In particular, P (x, y) = P(Xt+1 = y | Xt = x) for all x, y ∈ E and t = 0, 1, 2, . . ..
Under what conditions on P is [X0], [X1], [X2], . . . a Markov chain in the “reduced” state
space E¯? A sufficient condition, apparently due to Kemeny and Snell ([14], p. 124), is that
P be lumpable with respect to ∼. By definition, this means that, for all x, x′, y ∈ E,
x ∼ x′ implies
∑
y′∈[y]
P (x, y′) =
∑
y′∈[y]
P (x′, y′). (3.1)
Moreover, if (3.1) holds, then the Markov chain [X0], [X1], [X2], . . . in E¯ has transition
matrix P¯ given by
P¯ ([x], [y]) :=
∑
y′∈[y]
P (x, y′). (3.2)
Notice that (3.1) ensures that (3.2) is well defined.
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For Parrondo games with one-dimensional spatial dependence, the state space, assuming
N ≥ 3 players, is
Σ := {η = (η(1), η(2), . . . , η(N)) : η(x) ∈ {0, 1} for x = 1, 2, . . . , N} = {0, 1}N ,
which has 2N states. A state η ∈ Σ describes the status of each of the N players, 0 for
losers and 1 for winners. We can also think of Σ as the set of N -bit binary representations
of the integers 0, 1, . . . , 2N − 1, thereby giving a natural ordering to the vectors in Σ.
Ethier and Lee [6] used the following equivalence relation on Σ: η ∼ ζ if and only if
ζ = ησ := (η(σ(1)), . . . , η(σ(N))) for a permutation σ of (1, 2, . . . , N) belonging to the cyclic
group G of order N of the rotations of the players. If, in addition, p1 = p2, the permutation
σ can belong to the dihedral group G of order 2N of the rotations and reflections of the
players. They verified the lumpability condition, with the result that the size of the state
space was reduced by a factor of nearly N (or 2N if p1 = p2) for large N . It should be
noted that a sufficient condition for the lumpability condition in this setting is that, for
every η, ζ ∈ Σ,
P (ησ, ζσ) = P (η, ζ) for all σ ∈ G (3.3)
or for all σ in a subset of G that generates G.
To fully justify this, the following lemma is useful.
Lemma 3.1 (Ethier and Lee [7]). Fix N ≥ 3, let G be a subgroup of the symmetric
group SN . Let P be the one-step transition matrix for a Markov chain in Σ with a unique
stationary distribution pi. Assume that
P (ησ, ζσ) = P (η, ζ), σ ∈ G, η, ζ ∈ Σ. (3.4)
Then pi(ησ) = pi(η) for all σ ∈ G and η ∈ Σ.
Let us say that η ∈ Σ is equivalent to ζ ∈ Σ (written η ∼ ζ) if there exists σ ∈ G such
that ζ = ησ, and let us denote the equivalence class containing η by [η]. Then, in addition,
P induces a one-step transition matrix P¯ for a Markov chain in the quotient set (i.e., the
set of equivalence classes) Σ¯ defined by the formula
P¯ ([η], [ζ]) :=
∑
ζ′∈[ζ]
P (η, ζ ′), (3.5)
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Furthermore, if P¯ has a unique stationary distribution p¯i, then the unique stationary distri-
bution pi is given by pi(η) = p¯i([η])/|[η]|, where |[η]| denotes the cardinality of the equivalence
class [η].
The lemma will apply to PA′ and PB (hence PC′) if we can verify (3.4) for G being the
cyclic group of rotations or, if p1 = p2, the dihedral group of rotations and reflections.
The practical effect of this is that we can reduce the size of the state space (namely, 2N )
to what we will call its effective size, which is simply the number of equivalence classes. For
example, if N = 3, there are eight states and four equivalence classes, namely
0 = {000}, 1 = {001, 010, 100}, 2 = {011, 101, 110}, 3 = {111}.
Notice that we label equivalence classes by the number of 1s each element has. If N = 4,
there are 16 states and six equivalence classes, namely
0 = {0000},
1 = {0001, 0010, 0100, 1000},
2 = {0011, 0110, 1001, 1100},
2′ = {0101, 1010},
3 = {0111, 1011, 1101, 1110},
4 = {1111}.
In these two cases, it does not matter which of the two equivalence relations we use; the
result is the same.
The number of equivalence classes with G being the group of cyclic permutations follows
the sequence A000031 in the The On-Line Encyclopedia of Integer Sequences (Sloan, 2016),
described as the number of necklaces with N beads of two colors when turning over is
not allowed. There is an explicit formula in terms of Euler’s phi-function. If p1 = p2, we
can reverse the order of the players, and the number of equivalence classes with G being
the dihedral group follows the sequence A000029 in the OEIS, described as the number
of necklaces with N beads of two colors when turning over is allowed. Again, there is an
explicit formula. See Table 3.1.
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To illustrate our approach in a tractable case, we focus on the case N = 4. Here Σ has






d0 p0 p0 0 p0 0 0 0 p0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
q0 d1 0 p1 0 p0 0 0 0 p2 0 0 0 0 0 0
q0 0 d2 p2 0 0 p1 0 0 0 p0 0 0 0 0 0
0 q1 q2 d3 0 0 0 p1 0 0 0 p2 0 0 0 0
q0 0 0 0 d4 p0 p2 0 0 0 0 0 p1 0 0 0
0 q0 0 0 q0 d5 0 p3 0 0 0 0 0 p3 0 0
0 0 q1 0 q2 0 d6 p2 0 0 0 0 0 0 p1 0
0 0 0 q1 0 q3 q2 d7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 p3
q0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 d8 p1 p0 0 p2 0 0 0
0 q2 0 0 0 0 0 0 q1 d9 0 p1 0 p2 0 0
0 0 q0 0 0 0 0 0 q0 0 d10 p3 0 0 p3 0
0 0 0 q2 0 0 0 0 0 q1 q3 d11 0 0 0 p3
0 0 0 0 q1 0 0 0 q2 0 0 0 d12 p1 p2 0
0 0 0 0 0 q3 0 0 0 q2 0 0 q1 d13 0 p3
0 0 0 0 0 0 q1 0 0 0 q3 0 q2 0 d14 p3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 q3 0 0 0 q3 0 q3 q3 d15

,
where the diagonal entries are chosen to make the row sums equal to 1:
d0 := 4q0,
d1 = d2 = d4 = d8 := p0 + q0 + q1 + q2,
d3 = d6 = d9 = d12 := p1 + p2 + q1 + q2,
d5 = d10 := 2(p0 + q3),
d7 = d11 = d13 = d14 := p1 + p2 + p3 + q3,
d15 := 4p3,
and qm := 1− pm for m = 0, 1, 2, 3. This is consistent with Eq. (12) of Xie and others [21].
For the equivalence relation mentioned above, there are six equivalence classes, namely,
{0000}, {0001, 0010, 0100, 1000}, {0011, 0110, 1001, 1100}, {0101, 1010}, {0111, 1011, 1101,
1110}, and {1111}. Denoting the states by their decimal representations (0–15), the equiva-
lence classes are {0}, {1, 2, 4, 8}, {3, 6, 9, 12}, {5, 10}, {7, 11, 13, 14}, and {15}. It will be con-
venient to reorder the states temporarily. Within each equivalence class, we order elements
so that each is a fixed rotation of the preceding one, that is, {0000}, {1000, 0100, 0010, 0001},
{1100, 0110, 0011, 1001}, {1010, 0101}, {1110, 0111, 1011, 1101}, and {1111}, or {0}, {8, 4,
2, 1}, {12, 6, 3, 9}, {10, 5}, {14, 7, 11, 13}, and {15}. We now order states in this order: 0,
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d0 p0 p0 p0 p0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
q0 d8 0 0 0 p2 0 0 p1 p0 0 0 0 0 0 0
q0 0 d4 0 0 p1 p2 0 0 0 p0 0 0 0 0 0
q0 0 0 d2 0 0 p1 p2 0 p0 0 0 0 0 0 0
q0 0 0 0 d1 0 0 p1 p2 0 p0 0 0 0 0 0
0 q2 q1 0 0 d12 0 0 0 0 0 p2 0 0 p1 0
0 0 q2 q1 0 0 d6 0 0 0 0 p1 p2 0 0 0
0 0 0 q2 q1 0 0 d3 0 0 0 0 p1 p2 0 0
0 q1 0 0 q2 0 0 0 d9 0 0 0 0 p1 p2 0
0 q0 0 q0 0 0 0 0 0 d10 0 p3 0 p3 0 0
0 0 q0 0 q0 0 0 0 0 0 d5 0 p3 0 p3 0
0 0 0 0 0 q2 q1 0 0 q3 0 d14 0 0 0 p3
0 0 0 0 0 0 q2 q1 0 0 q3 0 d7 0 0 p3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 q2 q1 q3 0 0 0 d11 0 p3
0 0 0 0 0 q1 0 0 q2 0 q3 0 0 0 d13 p3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 q3 q3 q3 q3 d15

.
The lumpability condition requires that, within each block, row sums be equal. That this
condition is met can be seen at a glance. Moreover, we can also see that the sufficient
condition (3.3) holds as well. Because of how we ordered the states, this condition requires







4q0 4p0 0 0 0 0
q0 p0 + q0 + q1 + q2 p1 + p2 p0 0 0
0 q1 + q2 p1 + p2 + q1 + q2 0 p1 + p2 0
0 2q0 0 2(p0 + q3) 2p3 0
0 0 q1 + q2 q3 p1 + p2 + p3 + q3 p3
0 0 0 0 4q3 4p3
 .
(3.6)
We turn next to game A′. Again there are 16 states (namely, the 4-bit binary represen-






0 2 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 2 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 4 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 2 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 1 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 4 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 2 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 1 1 2 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 0

.
To verify the lumpability condition we reorder the states and rewrite the matrix in block





0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 2 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 2 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 2 1 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 4 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 2 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 1 2 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 2 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 1 2 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0

.





0 4 0 0 0 0
0 2 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 2 2 0 0
0 0 1 1 2 0
0 0 0 0 4 0
 . (3.7)
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We next check (3.4) in the general case when G is the cyclic subgroup of rotations of
(1, 2, . . . , N), that is, the group generated by
(σ(1), σ(2), . . . , σ(N)) := (2, 3, . . . , N, 1). (3.8)
Indeed, for such σ,









N−1pmx(η) if η(x) = 0
N−1qmx(η) if η(x) = 1
= PB(η, ηx) (3.9)
for x = 1, . . . , N and all η ∈ Σ, where the third equality uses
mx(ησ) = mσ(x)(η). (3.10)
If p1 = p2, then (3.9) also applies to the order-reversing permutation (or reflection) of
(1, 2, . . . , N),
(σ(1), σ(2), . . . , σ(N)) := (N,N − 1, . . . , 2, 1). (3.11)
For PA′ , we can verify the lumpability condition (3.3) by observing that, if (σ(1), . . . ,
σ(N)) = (2, 3, . . . , N, 1), then





x,x−1,−1, ζσ) + δ((ησ)x,x−1,1, ζσ)
+ δ((ησ)





σ−1(x),σ−1(x−1),−1, ζσ) + δ((ησ)σ
−1(x),σ−1(x−1),1, ζσ)
+ δ((ησ)





[δ((ηx,x−1,−1)σ, ζσ) + δ((ηx,x−1,1)σ, ζσ)








σ−1(x),σ−1(x±1),s = (ηx,x±1,s)σ. If (σ(1), . . . , σ(N)) = (N,N − 1, . . . , 2, 1), then the
same sequence of identities holds.
A fairly explicit formula for P¯B is given in Ethier and Lee (2012a). First, define the
function s : Σ¯ 7→ {0, 1, . . . , N} by s([η]) := η(1) + η(2) + · · · + η(N); it counts the number









if [ζ] = [η]
N−1
∑
x:η(x)=1,ηx∼ζ qmx(η) if s([ζ]) = s([η])− 1
N−1
∑
x:η(x)=0,ηx∼ζ pmx(η) if s([ζ]) = s([η]) + 1
0 otherwise












if |s([ζ])− s([η])| ≤ 1
0 otherwise
for all [η], [ζ] ∈ Σ¯. This generalizes (3.7).
3.2 Means and variances
We saw in Theorems 2.6 and 2.8 that the means and variances that appear in the SLLNs










are equal to the corresponding quantities defined in terms of the original transition matrices
(namely, µB, µ(γ,1−γ)′ , µ[r,s]′ , σ2B, σ
2
(γ,1−γ)′ , and σ
2
[r,s]′). We claim that the corresponding
quantities defined in terms of the reduced transition matrices (namely, µ¯B, µ¯(γ,1−γ)′ , µ¯[r,s]′ ,
σ¯2B, σ¯
2
(γ,1−γ)′ , and σ¯
2
[r,s]′) are also equal. First, we define
µ¯B := p¯iB
˙¯PB1, (3.12)











¨¯PB1− (p¯iB ˙¯PB1)2 + 2p¯iB ˙¯PB(Z¯B − 1p¯iB) ˙¯PB1, (3.15)
σ¯2(γ,1−γ)′ := p¯iC′


















































Proof. A result of Ethier and Lee [7] implies that, ifQ is aG-invariant square (not necessarily
stochastic) matrix (i.e., Q(ησ, ζσ) = Q(η, ζ) for all η, ζ ∈ Σ and all σ ∈ G), then
piQ1 = p¯iQ¯1.
Repeated application of this identity gives the desired conclusions.
The formulas for the means and variances with bars are computable for 3 ≤ N ≤ 18, at
least. We give results for the three choices of the parameter vector (p0, p1, p2, p3) treated
by Ethier and Lee [6] in Table 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 and three other choices in Table 3.5, 3.6,
and 3.7.
3.3 Computer graphics
Ethier and Lee [10] sketched, for games A′, B, and C ′ := 12A
′ + 12B, the Parrondo and
anti-Parrondo regions when 3 ≤ N ≤ 9. They assumed that p1 = p2 and relabeled p3 as p2.
In other words, their parameter vector was of the form (p0, p1, p1, p2). (The reason for this
simplification is that a three-dimensional figure is easier to visualize than a four-dimensional
figure.) See Figure 3.1, which includes only the cases 3 ≤ N ≤ 8. The figures for games
A′, B, and C ′ are distinctively different from those for games A, B, and C := 12A+
1
2B. In
both cases, the general shape of the Parrondo and anti-Parrondo regions does not change
much, once N ≥ 5.
Here we do the same for games A′, B, and (A′)rBs for [r, s]′ = [1, 1]′, [2, 1]′, [1, 2]′, [2, 2]′
and 3 ≤ N ≤ 6 in Figure 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 respectively. Larger N could be considered,
but it would be very time-consuming.
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Table 3.1. The size and effective size of the state space when there are N players. (Used
by permission from Ethier and Lee [6].)
number of size of effective size effective size
players state space not assuming assuming
N 2N p1 = p2 p1 = p2
3 8 4 4
4 16 6 6
5 32 8 8
6 64 14 13
7 128 20 18
8 256 36 30
9 512 60 46
10 1024 108 78
11 2048 188 126
12 4096 352 224
13 8192 632 380
14 16384 1182 687
15 32768 2192 1224
16 65536 4116 2250
17 131072 7712 4112
18 262144 14602 7685
19 524288 27596 14310
20 1048576 52488 27012
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Table 3.2. Mean profit per turn at equilibrium in the games of Xie and others (2011),
assuming (p0, p1, p2, p3) = (1, 0.16, 0.16, 0.7). Results are given to six significant digits.
Notice that µB < 0 for 3 ≤ N ≤ 19 except for N = 4, 7, 8, so the Parrondo effect is present
except in 28 of the 113 cases. The entries corresponding to N = ∞ are limits as N → ∞
(see Theorem 6.3). The blank entries were not computed. The behavior in the µ[1,1]′ column
cannot easily be explained.
N µB µ(1/2,1/2)′ µ[1,1]′ µ[1,2]′ µ[1,3]′ µ[2,1]′ µ[2,2]′ µ[3,1]′
3 −0.0909091 −0.0766158 −0.105479 −0.102038 −0.0993971 −0.0724638 −0.0773252 −0.0547919
4 0.00799608 0.0156538 0.00471698 0.0148270 0.0239996 0.00325815 0.0125698 0.00247440
5 −0.00219465 0.00565126 0.00593697 0.00950811 0.00863794 0.00345975 0.00774689 0.00248827
6 −0.0189247 0.00671656 0.00640351 0.00955597 0.00994894 0.00363075 0.00745377 0.00255559
7 0.00350598 0.00680337 0.00660065 0.00923799 0.00960154 0.00380363 0.00724937 0.00263585
8 0.000698188 0.00678290 0.00670338 0.00901760 0.00922885 0.00393034 0.00713139 0.00270983
9 −0.00189233 0.00678314 0.00676079 0.00887095 0.00900601 0.00402382 0.00705972 0.00277296
10 −0.000332809 0.00678338 0.00679458 0.00876090 0.00884263 0.00409432 0.00701287 0.00282563
11 −0.000466527 0.00678336 0.00681519 0.00867466 0.00871398 0.00414879 0.00698037 0.00286945
12 −0.000676916 0.00678336 0.00682799 0.00860524 0.00861168 0.00419181 0.00695667 0.00290610
13 −0.000562901 0.00678336 0.00683598 0.00854800 0.00852823 0.00422647 0.00693865 0.00293700
14 −0.000569340 0.00678336 0.00684090 0.00849991 0.00845874 0.00425488 0.00692447 0.00296329
15 −0.000586184 0.00678336 0.00684381 0.00845891 0.00839996 0.00427852 0.00691300 0.00298586
16 −0.000578161 0.00678336 0.00684537 0.00842351 0.00834957 0.00429845 0.00690350 0.00300539
17 −0.000578345 0.00678336 0.00684603 0.00839260 0.00830588 0.00431545 0.00689547 0.00302245
18 −0.000579652 0.00678336 0.00684607 0.00836539 0.00826762 0.00433011 0.00688859 0.00303744
19 −0.000579095 0.00678336
∞ 0.00678336 0.00678336 0.00792947 0.00768253 0.00451510 0.00678336 0.00325825
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Table 3.3. Mean profit per turn at equilibrium in the games of Xie and others [21], assuming
(p0, p1, p2, p3) = (0.7, 0.68, 0.68, 0). Results are given to six significant digits. Notice that
µB < 0 for 3 ≤ N ≤ 19 except N = 3, 5, so the Parrondo effect is present except in 15 of
the 107 cases. The entries corresponding to N = ∞ are limits as N → ∞ (see Theorem
6.3). The blank entries were not computed.
N µB µ(1/2,1/2)′ µ[1,1]′ µ[1,2]′ µ[1,3]′ µ[2,1]′ µ[2,2]′ µ[3,1]′
3 0.0710383 0.0525560 0.0636364 0.0684422 0.0697086 0.0453956 0.0547457 0.0346926
4 −0.0425713 0.00095265 0.0131579 0.00461772 −0.00332027 0.00948905 0.00383213 0.00732323
5 0.00257895 0.00765099 0.0114243 0.00947342 0.00771190 0.00914217 0.00893883 0.00720557
6 −0.0102930 0.00684126 0.0103803 0.00812693 0.00550684 0.00876089 0.00887906 0.00705384
7 −0.00722622 0.00691714 0.00975869 0.00772430 0.00542861 0.00845243 0.00877155 0.00690363
8 −0.00808338 0.00691038 0.00932190 0.00733991 0.00509927 0.00821008 0.00862704 0.00677033
9 −0.00784318 0.00691100 0.00900193 0.00706166 0.00488742 0.00801817 0.00848795 0.00665614
10 −0.00790952 0.00691094 0.00875695 0.00684162 0.00470929 0.00786365 0.00836210 0.00655914
11 −0.00789119 0.00691095 0.00856340 0.00666505 0.00456481 0.00773709 0.00825093 0.00647657
12 −0.00789624 0.00691095 0.00840660 0.00652010 0.00444435 0.00763177 0.00815337 0.00640584
13 −0.00789485 0.00691095 0.00827699 0.00639908 0.00434270 0.00754288 0.00806773 0.00634480
14 −0.00789523 0.00691095 0.00816807 0.00629653 0.00425580 0.00746692 0.00799229 0.00629171
15 −0.00789513 0.00691095 0.00807523 0.00620855 0.00418071 0.00740130 0.00792555 0.00624519
16 −0.00789516 0.00691095 0.00799517 0.00613226 0.00411520 0.00734408 0.00786619 0.00620414
17 −0.00789515 0.00691095 0.00792541 0.00606547 0.00405756 0.00729375 0.00781314 0.00616766
18 −0.00789515 0.00691095
19 −0.00789515 0.00691095
∞ −0.00789515 0.00691095 0.00691095 0.00506459 0.00316518 0.00651648 0.00691095 0.00556811
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Table 3.4. Mean profit per turn at equilibrium in the games of Xie and others [21],
assuming (p0, p1, p2, p3) = (0.1, 0.6, 0.6, 0.75). Results are given to six significant digits.
Notice that µB < 0 for 3 ≤ N ≤ 19, so the Parrondo effect is present in all 107 cases. The
entries corresponding to N =∞ are limits as N →∞ (see Theorem 6.3). The blank entries
were not computed.
N µB µ(1/2,1/2)′ µ[1,1]′ µ[1,2]′ µ[1,3]′ µ[2,1]′ µ[2,2]′ µ[3,1]′
3 −0.190476 0.0250737 0.0459318 0.0459668 0.0355311 0.0285193 0.0313076 0.0210062
4 −0.0858189 0.0175362 0.0143678 0.0270909 0.0320082 0.00877193 0.0193958 0.00639330
5 −0.0389980 0.0169208 0.0153125 0.0243523 0.0288300 0.00901530 0.0166844 0.00648456
6 −0.0183165 0.0168327 0.0157452 0.0240900 0.0280593 0.00924263 0.0165391 0.00658522
7 −0.00924232 0.0168224 0.0160005 0.0239721 0.0276476 0.00941580 0.0165074 0.00667774
8 −0.00528548 0.0168213 0.0161641 0.0238960 0.0273667 0.00954592 0.0165118 0.00675629
9 −0.00356984 0.0168212 0.0162764 0.0238393 0.0271612 0.00964554 0.0165279 0.00682153
10 −0.00282963 0.0168212 0.0163577 0.0237943 0.0270043 0.00972360 0.0165471 0.00687564
11 −0.00251155 0.0168211 0.0164188 0.0237576 0.0268804 0.00978610 0.0165662 0.00692084
12 −0.00237531 0.0168211 0.0164664 0.0237269 0.0267800 0.00983717 0.0165840 0.00695896
13 −0.00231709 0.0168211 0.0165043 0.0237008 0.0266969 0.00987957 0.0166002 0.00699142
14 −0.00229226 0.0168211 0.0165351 0.0236782 0.0266269 0.00991530 0.0166148 0.00701933
15 −0.00228169 0.0168211 0.0165607 0.0236585 0.0265671 0.00994578 0.0166279 0.00704355
16 −0.00227719 0.0168211 0.0165822 0.0236412 0.0265154 0.00997208 0.0166396 0.00706473
17 −0.00227528 0.0168211 0.0166006 0.0236258 0.0264703 0.00999500 0.0166501 0.00708341
18 −0.00227446 0.0168211
19 −0.00227412 0.0168211
∞ 0.0168211 0.0168211 0.0233648 0.0257907 0.0103217 0.0168211 0.00737111
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Table 3.5. Mean profit per turn at equilibrium in the games of Xie and others [21],
assuming (p0, p1, p2, p3) = (0, 0.8, 0.8, 0.5). Results are given to six significant digits. Notice
that µB = −1 for 3 ≤ N ≤ 17, so the Parrondo effect is present in all 105 cases. The entries
corresponding to N =∞ are limits as N →∞ (see Theorem 6.3).
N µB µ(1/2,1/2)′ µ[1,1]′ µ[1,2]′ µ[1,3]′ µ[2,1]′ µ[2,2]′ µ[3,1]′
3 −1 0.0700935 0.125641 0.120719 0.0949431 0.0793651 0.0832734 0.0587049
4 −1 0.0312943 0.0277778 0.0518280 0.0569121 0.0173333 0.0391038 0.0127193
5 −1 0.0334457 0.0297026 0.0466364 0.0552000 0.0177825 0.0328559 0.0128710
6 −1 0.0329776 0.0306359 0.0458271 0.0523336 0.0182363 0.0324445 0.0130605
7 −1 0.0329365 0.0311909 0.0455525 0.0512224 0.0185913 0.0323592 0.0132431
8 −1 0.0329318 0.0315485 0.0453778 0.0505181 0.0188624 0.0323574 0.0134018
9 −1 0.0329314 0.0317936 0.0452410 0.0500111 0.0190722 0.0323834 0.0135356
10 −1 0.0329313 0.0319703 0.0451282 0.0496216 0.0192379 0.0324177 0.0136478
11 −1 0.0329313 0.0321027 0.0450332 0.0493112 0.0193714 0.0324528 0.0137424
12 −1 0.0329313 0.0322052 0.0449521 0.0490575 0.0194808 0.0324861 0.0138225
13 −1 0.0329313 0.0322865 0.0448820 0.0488459 0.0195720 0.0325166 0.0138912
14 −1 0.0329313 0.0323523 0.0448208 0.0486666 0.0196490 0.0325441 0.0139505
15 −1 0.0329313 0.0324067 0.0447670 0.0485126 0.0197149 0.0325688 0.0140021
16 −1 0.0329313 0.0324522 0.0447192 0.0483788 0.0197718 0.0325688 0.0140474
17 −1 0.0329313 0.0324907 0.0446700 0.0482615 0.0198214 0.0326108 0.0140874
∞ −1 0.0329313 0.0329313 0.0439298 0.0464462 0.0205333 0.0329313 0.0147142
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Table 3.6. Mean profit per turn at equilibrium in the games of Xie and others [21],
assuming (p0, p1, p2, p3) = (0.78, 0.65, 0.65, 0). Results are given to six significant digits.
Notice that µB < 0 for 3 ≤ N ≤ 17 except for N = 3, 5, so the Parrondo effect is present
except in 14 of the 105 cases. The entries corresponding to N = ∞ are limits as N → ∞
(see Theorem 6.3). The blank entries were not computed.
N µB µ(1/2,1/2)′ µ[1,1]′ µ[1,2]′ µ[1,3]′ µ[2,1]′ µ[2,2]′ µ[3,1]′
3 0.0649566 0.0478973 0.0569837 0.0623296 0.0637036 0.0409447 0.0502669 0.0313571
4 −0.0388363 0.00577713 0.0173010 0.0105370 0.0034869 0.0125786 0.00889721 0.00973808
5 0.00672837 0.0117080 0.0156329 0.0146990 0.0131555 0.0121857 0.0133209 0.00958235
6 −0.0119357 0.0109211 0.0146005 0.0132671 0.0108107 0.0117909 0.0131938 0.00941062
7 −0.00448927 0.0110144 0.0139764 0.0128216 0.0107077 0.0114764 0.0130462 0.00924977
8 −0.00756841 0.0110033 0.0135325 0.0123876 0.0102846 0.0112301 0.0128741 0.00911021
9 −0.00631011 0.0110047 0.0132049 0.0120781 0.0100324 0.0110351 0.0127156 0.00899195
10 −0.00682669 0.0110045 0.0129524 0.0118314 0.00981392 0.0108779 0.0125752 0.00889207
11 −0.00661495 0.0110045 0.0127520 0.0116336 0.00963960 0.0107491 0.0124525 0.00880731
12 −0.00670177 0.0110045 0.0125890 0.0114710 0.00949408 0.0106417 0.0123457 0.00873485
13 −0.00666618 0.0110045 0.0124539 0.0113350 0.00937165 0.0105509 0.0122523 0.00867238
14 −0.00668077 0.0110045 0.0123400 0.0112197 0.00926711 0.0104733 0.0121703 0.00861808
15 −0.00667479 0.0110045 0.0122427 0.0111207 0.00917686 0.0104061 0.0120980 0.00857051
16 −0.00667724 0.0110045 0.0121586 0.0110348 0.00909819 0.0103475 0.0120337 0.00852853
17 −0.00667623 0.0110045 0.0120853 0.0109595 0.00902901 0.0102959 0.0119764 0.00849125
∞ 0.0110045 0.0110045 0.00982296 0.00795942 0.00949246 0.0110045 0.00787643
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Table 3.7. Mean profit per turn at equilibrium in the games of Xie and others [21],
assuming (p0, p1, p2, p3) = (0.9, 0.54, 0.54, 0.05). Results are given to six significant digits.
Notice that µB < 0 for 3 ≤ N ≤ 17 except for N = 3, 5, so the Parrondo effect is present
except in 14 of the 105 cases. The entries corresponding to N = ∞ are limits as N → ∞
(see Theorem 6.3). The blank entries were not computed.
N µB µ(1/2,1/2)′ µ[1,1]′ µ[1,2]′ µ[1,3]′ µ[2,1]′ µ[2,2]′ µ[3,1]′
3 0.0186100 0.0138568 0.0163482 0.0180393 0.0184102 0.0118203 0.0146580 0.00906909
4 −0.0116982 0.00305201 0.00641026 0.00478337 0.00286234 0.00469314 0.00405576 0.00364322
5 0.00304411 0.00465818 0.00591223 0.00587933 0.00545615 0.00455730 0.00524184 0.00358348
6 −0.00560270 0.00442670 0.00559742 0.00542162 0.00470623 0.00443058 0.00518684 0.00352406
7 −0.00099606 0.00446002 0.00540436 0.00527306 0.00466731 0.00433109 0.00513152 0.00347081
8 −0.00358987 0.00445522 0.00526572 0.00512618 0.00450849 0.00425351 0.00507162 0.00342552
9 −0.00217231 0.00445591 0.00516276 0.00502269 0.00442020 0.00419216 0.00501795 0.00338753
10 −0.00296007 0.00445581 0.00508303 0.00493948 0.00434044 0.00414271 0.00497098 0.00335562
11 −0.00252629 0.00445583 0.00501949 0.00487281 0.00427808 0.00410213 0.00493028 0.00332863
12 −0.00276636 0.00445582 0.00496765 0.00481785 0.00422566 0.00406830 0.00489498 0.00330560
13 −0.00263387 0.00445583 0.00492455 0.00477187 0.00418172 0.00403968 0.00486424 0.00328578
14 −0.00270711 0.00445582 0.00488816 0.00473281 0.00414416 0.00401518 0.00483730 0.00326856
15 −0.00266666 0.00445582 0.00485701 0.00469924 0.00411176 0.00399397 0.00481355 0.00325349
16 −0.00268901 0.00445582 0.00483005 0.00467007 0.00408351 0.00397545 0.00479249 0.00324019
17 −0.00267666 0.00445582 0.00480648 0.00464450 0.00405867 0.00395913 0.00477371 0.00322838
∞ 0.00445582 0.00445582 0.00425571 0.00370360 0.00445582 0.00303347
40
N = 3 N = 4
N = 5 N = 6
N = 7 N = 8
Figure 3.1. For 3 ≤ N ≤ 8 and γ = 1/2, the blue surface is the surface µB = 0, and
the red surface is the surface µ(1/2,1/2)′ = 0, in the (p0, p2, p1) unit cube. The Parrondo
region is the region on or below the blue surface and above the red surface, while the
anti-Parrondo region is the region on or above the blue surface and below the red surface.
Here (p0, p1, p1, p3) is relabeled as (p0, p1, p1, p2). (Used by permission from Ethier and Lee
[10].)
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N = 3 N = 4
N = 5 N = 6
Figure 3.2. For 3 ≤ N ≤ 6, the blue surface is the surface µB = 0, and the red surface
is the surface µ[1,1]′ = 0, in the (p0, p2, p1) unit cube. The Parrondo region is the region
on or below the blue surface and above the red surface, while the anti-Parrondo region is
the region on or above the blue surface and below the red surface. Here (p0, p1, p1, p3) is
relabeled as (p0, p1, p1, p2).
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N = 3 N = 4
N = 5 N = 6
Figure 3.3. For 3 ≤ N ≤ 6, the blue surface is the surface µB = 0, and the red surface
is the surface µ[2,1]′ = 0, in the (p0, p2, p1) unit cube. The Parrondo region is the region
on or below the blue surface and above the red surface, while the anti-Parrondo region is
the region on or above the blue surface and below the red surface. Here (p0, p1, p1, p3) is
relabeled as (p0, p1, p1, p2).
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N = 3 N = 4
N = 5 N = 6
Figure 3.4. For 3 ≤ N ≤ 6, the blue surface is the surface µB = 0, and the red surface
is the surface µ[1,2]′ = 0, in the (p0, p2, p1) unit cube. The Parrondo region is the region
on or below the blue surface and above the red surface, while the anti-Parrondo region is
the region on or above the blue surface and below the red surface. Here (p0, p1, p1, p3) is
relabeled as (p0, p1, p1, p2).
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N = 3 N = 4
N = 5 N = 6
Figure 3.5. For 3 ≤ N ≤ 6, the blue surface is the surface µB = 0, and the red surface
is the surface µ[2,2]′ = 0, in the (p0, p2, p1) unit cube. The Parrondo region is the region
on or below the blue surface and above the red surface, while the anti-Parrondo region is
the region on or above the blue surface and below the red surface. Here (p0, p1, p1, p3) is
relabeled as (p0, p1, p1, p2).
CHAPTER 4
A BASIC SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR
ERGODICITY
So far, the state space of our basic Markov chain has been ΣN := {0, 1}N , though we
have usually omitted the subscript N for convenience. Now we want to regard the players,
originally labeled from 1 to N , as labeled from lN to rN , where
lN :=
{
−(N − 1)/2 if N is odd,
−N/2 if N is even, rN :=
{
(N − 1)/2 if N is odd,
N/2− 1 if N is even.
Then we can speed up time, playing N games per unit of time, and our process is described
in the limit as N → ∞ by an interacting particle system in the state space Σ := {0, 1}Z.
The details of this limit operation are postponed to Chapter 6. Initially, our concern is with
the ergodicity of the limiting interacting particle system.
In this chapter, we apply Liggett’s [15] sufficient condition for ergodicity of an interacting
particle system, first to ΩA′ , the interacting particle system corresponding to game A
′,
then to ΩB, the spin system corresponding to game B (this part has already been done),
and finally to ΩC′ , the interacting particle system corresponding to the random mixture
C ′ := γA′ + (1− γ)B.
4.1 Analysis of ΩA′
The generator ΩA′ of the interacting particle system corresponding to game A
′ can be
described as follows. For η ∈ Σ := {0, 1}Z and x ∈ Z, define ηx and xηx+1 in Σ by
ηx(y) :=
{




η(x+ 1) if y = x,

















To see where (4.1) comes from, recall from Section 2.3 the notation ηx,x±1,±1. We define
ηx,x−1,−1(y) :=

1 if y = x− 1,




0 if y = x− 1,




0 if y = x,




1 if y = x,

















































































































































Thus, the generator ΩA′ is the sum of a spin system generator and an exclusion process
generator.
Liggett’s [15] Theorem I.4.1 (page 31) gives a sufficient condition for ergodicity of an
interacting particle system. The requirement is that M < ε, where M is given by (I.3.8)
(page 26) defined in terms of cT (u) (page 23) which in turn is defined in terms of cT (η, dζ)
(page 22), and ε is also defined in terms of cT (η, dζ) (page 24). The various formulas are
given below.
Our first goal is to calculate M and ε in the case of the interacting particle system with
generator ΩA′ . For each η ∈ Σ := {0, 1}Z and finite T ⊂ Z, cT (η, dζ) is assumed to be a
finite positive measure on {0, 1}T . Define ηζ by
ηζ(x) =
{
ζ(x) if x ∈ T
η(x) if x /∈ T




































































c{x}(η,G) = δ1−η(x)(G)c′(x, η) and c{x,x+1}(η,H) = δ(1−η(x),1−η(x+1))(H)121{η(x)6=η(x+1)},
where δu is the unit mass concentrated at u. Here G ⊂ {0, 1} and H ⊂ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0),
(1, 1)}.
We can now evaluate M . For u ∈ Z and finite T ⊂ Z, let cT (u) := sup{‖cT (η, dζ) −
cT (η
′, dζ)‖TV : η(y) = η′(y) ∀ y 6= u}, where ‖ · ‖TV denotes the total variation norm of a




















































































|c′(x, η)− c′(x, ηx+1)|+ sup
η∈Σ


























[1{η(x)=η(x+1)} + 1{η(x)=1−η(x−1)}] (4.6)




η=η′ off u, η(u)6=η′(u)
∑
T3u
[cT (η, {ζ ∈ {0, 1}T : ζ(u) = η′(u)})
+ cT (η






c{u}(η, {ηu(u)}) + c{u}(ηu, {η(u)})
+ c{u,u+1}(η, {ζ ∈ {0, 1}{u,u+1} : ζ(u) = ηu(u)})
+ c{u,u+1}(ηu, {ζ ∈ {0, 1}{u,u+1} : ζ(u) = η(u)})
+ c{u−1,u}(η, {ζ ∈ {0, 1}{u−1,u} : ζ(u) = ηu(u)})







c{u}(η, {1− η(u)}) + c{u}(ηu, {1− ηu(u)})
+ c{u,u+1}(η, {ζ ∈ {0, 1}{u,u+1} : ζ(u) = 1− η(u)})
+ c{u,u+1}(ηu, {ζ ∈ {0, 1}{u,u+1} : ζ(u) = η(u)})
+ c{u−1,u}(η, {ζ ∈ {0, 1}{u−1,u} : ζ(u) = 1− η(u)})












[c′(x, η) + c′(x, ηx)] + 1
= 2, (4.7)












[1{1−η(x)=η(x+1)} + 1{1−η(x)=η(x−1)}]. (4.9)
We conclude that M = ε = 2. Since M < ε is a sufficient condition for ergodicity, the
condition is inconclusive for ergodicity in this case. However, these calculations will prove
useful in analyzing ΩC′ .
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4.2 Analysis of ΩB
Our second goal is to calculate M and ε in the case of the spin system with generator
ΩB. For each η ∈ Σ := {0, 1}Z and finite T ⊂ Z, cT (η, dζ) is assumed to be a finite positive
measure on {0, 1}T . For each x ∈ Z, define ηx by
ηx(y) :=
{
1− η(x) if y = x,
η(y) if y 6= x.





for f ∈ C(Σ) depending on only finitely many coordinates, where
c(x, η) =
{
pmx(η) if η(x) = 0,
qmx(η) if η(x) = 1,
(4.10)
qm := 1− pm for m = 0, 1, 2, 3, and mx(η) := 2η(x− 1) + η(x+ 1) ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
What is cT (η, dζ) here? Recall that, for ζ ∈ {0, 1}T ,
ηζ(x) :=
{
ζ(x) if x ∈ T ,
η(x) if x /∈ T .




























We conclude that c{x}(η,G) = δ1−η(x)(G)c(x, η) for all G ⊂ {0, 1}, where δu is the unit
mass at u.
We can now evaluate M . For u ∈ Z and finite T ⊂ Z, let cT (u) := sup{‖cT (η, dζ) −
cT (η
′, dζ)‖TV : η(y) = η′(y) ∀ y 6= u}, where ‖ · ‖TV denotes the total variation norm of a













































η=η′ off u, η(u)6=η′(u)
∑
T3u















[c(u, η) + c(u, ηu)]
= inf
x∈Z, η∈Σ
[c(x, η) + c(x, ηx)].







|c(x, η)− c(x, ηu)| < inf
x∈Z, η∈Σ
[c(x, η) + c(x, ηx)], (4.11)
which is the same result as (III.0.6) of Liggett (1985).
Now we use (4.10), in which case the right side of (4.11) is 1. On the left side of (4.11),
the sum has only two terms, corresponding to u = x± 1. We can evaluate the left side with
the help of Table 4.3.
The result is that (4.11) is equivalent to
max(|p0 − p1|, |p2 − p3|) + max(|p0 − p2|, |p1 − p3|) < 1.
The volume of the subset of the parameter space [0, 1]4 for which this inequality holds is,
by Mathematica, 7/12.
Ethier and Lee [8] used other methods to show that ergodicity holds on a subset of
volume estimated to be 0.789.
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4.3 Analysis of ΩC ′ := γΩA′ + (1− γ)ΩB
Our third goal is to calculate M and ε in the case of the interacting particle system with
generator ΩC′ . For each η ∈ Σ := {0, 1}Z and finite T ⊂ Z, cT (η, dζ) is assumed to be a
finite positive measure on {0, 1}T . Define ηx, xηx+1, and ηζ by
ηx(y) :=
{
1− η(x) if y = x,
η(y) if y 6= x, xηx+1(y) :=

η(x+ 1) if y = x,




ζ(x) if x ∈ T ,
η(x) if x /∈ T ,
for ζ ∈ {0, 1}T and x ∈ Z. Then

















[1{η(x)=η(x+1)} + 1{η(x)=η(x−1)}], c(x, η) =
{
pmx(η) if η(x) = 0,
qmx(η) if η(x) = 1,
qm := 1− pm for m = 0, 1, 2, 3, and mx(η) := 2η(x− 1) + η(x+ 1) ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
The generator ΩC′ is the sum of a spin system generator and an exclusion process
generator. What is cT (η, dζ)? It should be a mixture of the measures found in Sections 4.1
and 4.2. We conclude that





We can now evaluate M . For u ∈ Z and finite T ⊂ Z, let cT (u) := sup{‖cT (η, dζ) −
cT (η
′, dζ)‖TV : η(y) = η′(y) ∀ y 6= u}, where ‖ · ‖TV denotes the total variation norm of a































































































|γ[c′(x, η)− c′(x, ηx+1)] + (1− γ)[c(x, η)− c(x, ηx+1)]|
+ sup
η∈Σ




[∣∣∣∣γ2 + (1− γ)(p0 − p1)
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣γ2 + (1− γ)(p2 − p3)
∣∣∣∣]
+ max
[∣∣∣∣γ2 + (1− γ)(p0 − p2)
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣γ2 + (1− γ)(p1 − p3)
∣∣∣∣]+ γ, (4.13)
























pmx(η) if η(x) = 0,
qmx(η) if η(x) = 1,
c(x, ηx+1) =
{
pmx(ηx+1) if η(x) = 0,
qmx(ηx+1) if η(x) = 1,
c(x, ηx−1) =
{
pmx(ηx−1) if η(x) = 0,
qmx(ηx−1) if η(x) = 1,
where qm := 1− pm for m = 0, 1, 2, 3 and mx(η) := 2η(x− 1) + η(x+ 1) ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. The
last line of (4.13) is from Tables 4.4–4.6 below.




η=η′ off u, η(u) 6=η′(u)
∑
T3u
[cT (η, {ζ ∈ {0, 1}T : ζ(u) = η′(u)})
+ cT (η






c{u}(η, {ηu(u)}) + c{u}(ηu, {η(u)})
+ c{u,u+1}(η, {ζ ∈ {0, 1}{u,u+1} : ζ(u) = ηu(u)})
+ c{u,u+1}(ηu, {ζ ∈ {0, 1}{u,u+1} : ζ(u) = η(u)})
+ c{u−1,u}(η, {ζ ∈ {0, 1}{u−1,u} : ζ(u) = ηu(u)})







c{u}(η, {1− η(u)}) + c{u}(ηu, {1− ηu(u)})
+ c{u,u+1}(η, {ζ ∈ {0, 1}{u,u+1} : ζ(u) = 1− η(u)})
+ c{u,u+1}(ηu, {ζ ∈ {0, 1}{u,u+1} : ζ(u) = 1− ηu(u)})
+ c{u−1,u}(η, {ζ ∈ {0, 1}{u−1,u} : ζ(u) = 1− η(u)})







γ[c′(u, η) + c′(u, ηu)] + (1− γ)[c(u, η) + c(u, ηu)]
]
+ 2 · γ
2
= 1 + γ, (4.14)













The last step of (4.14) is from column 7 of Table 4.7.
We have proved the following theorem.
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Theorem 4.1. The interacting particle system in Σ := {0, 1}Z with generator ΩC′ :=
γΩA′ + (1− γ)ΩB, where 0 < γ < 1, is ergodic if
max
[∣∣∣∣γ2 + (1− γ)(p0 − p1)
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣γ2 + (1− γ)(p2 − p3)
∣∣∣∣]
+ max
[∣∣∣∣γ2 + (1− γ)(p0 − p2)
∣∣∣∣, ∣∣∣∣γ2 + (1− γ)(p1 − p3)
∣∣∣∣] < 1. (4.15)
The volume of the subset of the parameter space [0, 1]4 for which (4.15) holds with
γ = 1/2 is, by Mathematica, 5/6. Of the six examples studied in Section 3.2, namely
(p0, p1, p2, p3) = (1, 0.16, 0.16, 0.7), (0.7, 0.68, 0.68, 0), (0.1, 0.6, 0.6, 0.75), (0, 0.8, 0.8, 0.5),
(0.78, 0.65, 0.65, 0), and (0.9, 0.54, 0.54, 0.05), the third, fourth, and sixth satisfy (4.15) with
γ = 1/2.
If we assume that p1 = p2, then the volume of the subset of the parameter space [0, 1]
3
for which (4.15) holds is, by Mathematica, 3/4. In fact, we plot the three-dimensional
volume as a function of γ in Figure 4.1.
Notice that the volume is 3/4 if and only if γ ≥ 1/3.
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Table 4.1. Calculations for the last step of (4.3).
(. . . , η(x− 1), η(x), η(x+ 1), . . .) (4.4), (4.5), (4.6) (∗) (∗∗)
















































(∗) := |c′(x, η)− c′(x, ηx+1)|, (∗∗) := |c′(x, η)− c′(x, ηx−1)|.
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Table 4.2. Calculations for the last step of (4.7).
(. . . , η(x− 1), η(x), η(x+ 1), . . .) (4.8), (4.9) c′(x, η) + c′(x, ηx)
(. . . , 0, 0, 0, . . .) 1, 0 1
(. . . , 0, 0, 1, . . .) 12 ,
1
2 1
(. . . , 0, 1, 0, . . .) 0, 1 1
(. . . , 0, 1, 1, . . .) 12 ,
1
2 1
(. . . , 1, 0, 0, . . .) 12 ,
1
2 1
(. . . , 1, 0, 1, . . .) 0, 1 1
(. . . , 1, 1, 0, . . .) 12 ,
1
2 1
(. . . , 1, 1, 1, . . .) 1, 0 1
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Table 4.3. Evaluating the left side of (4.11).
η(x− 1) η(x+ 1) mx(η) mx(ηx−1) mx(ηx+1)
0 0 0 2 1
0 1 1 3 0
1 0 2 0 3
1 1 3 1 2
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Table 4.4. Calculations for the last step of (4.13).
1 2 3 4 5 6(
η(x− 1), η(x), η(x+ 1)) c′(x, η) c′(x, ηx+1) c′(x, ηx−1) c(x, η) c(x, ηx+1) c(x, ηx−1)
(0, 0, 0) 1 12
1
2 p0 p1 p2
(0, 0, 1) 12 1 0 p1 p0 p3
(0, 1, 0) 0 12
1
2 q0 q1 q2
(0, 1, 1) 12 0 1 q1 q0 q3
(1, 0, 0) 12 0 1 p2 p3 p0
(1, 0, 1) 0 12
1
2 p3 p2 p1
(1, 1, 0) 12 1 0 q2 q3 q0
(1, 1, 1) 1 12
1
2 q3 q2 q1
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Table 4.5. Calculations for the last step of (4.13), continued.
7 8 9 10(
η(x− 1), η(x), η(x+ 1)) γ(1− 2) (1− γ)(4− 5) γ(1− 3) (1− γ)(4− 6)
(0, 0, 0) γ2 (1− γ)(p0 − p1) γ2 (1− γ)(p0 − p2)
(0, 0, 1) −γ2 (1− γ)(p1 − p0) γ2 (1− γ)(p1 − p3)
(0, 1, 0) −γ2 (1− γ)(q0 − q1) −γ2 (1− γ)(q0 − q2)
(0, 1, 1) γ2 (1− γ)(q1 − q0) −γ2 (1− γ)(q1 − q3)
(1, 0, 0) γ2 (1− γ)(p2 − p3) −γ2 (1− γ)(p2 − p0)
(1, 0, 1) −γ2 (1− γ)(p3 − p2) −γ2 (1− γ)(p3 − p1)
(1, 1, 0) −γ2 (1− γ)(q2 − q3) γ2 (1− γ)(q2 − q0)
(1, 1, 1) γ2 (1− γ)(q3 − q2) γ2 (1− γ)(q3 − q1)
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Table 4.6. Calculations for the last step of (4.13), continued.
|7 + 8| |9 + 10|
(0, 0, 0)
∣∣γ
2 + (1− γ)(p0 − p1)
∣∣ ∣∣γ




2 + (1− γ)(p0 − p1)
∣∣ ∣∣γ




2 + (1− γ)(p0 − p1)
∣∣ ∣∣γ




2 + (1− γ)(p0 − p1)
∣∣ ∣∣γ




2 + (1− γ)(p2 − p3)
∣∣ ∣∣γ




2 + (1− γ)(p2 − p3)
∣∣ ∣∣γ




2 + (1− γ)(p2 − p3)
∣∣ ∣∣γ




2 + (1− γ)(p2 − p3)
∣∣ ∣∣γ
2 + (1− γ)(p1 − p3)
∣∣
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Table 4.7. Calculations for the last step of (4.14).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7(
η(u− 1), η(u), η(u+ 1)) c′(u, η) c′(u, ηu) c(u, η) c(u, ηu) γ(1 + 2) (1− γ)(3 + 4) (5 + 6)
(0, 0, 0) 1 0 p0 q0 γ 1− γ 1
(0, 0, 1) 12
1
2 p1 q1 γ 1− γ 1
(0, 1, 0) 0 1 q0 p0 γ 1− γ 1
(0, 1, 1) 12
1
2 q1 p1 γ 1− γ 1
(1, 0, 0) 12
1
2 p2 q2 γ 1− γ 1
(1, 0, 1) 0 1 p3 q3 γ 1− γ 1
(1, 1, 0) 12
1
2 q2 p2 γ 1− γ 1
(1, 1, 1) 1 0 q3 p3 γ 1− γ 1
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Figure 4.1. Assuming p1 = p2, the three-dimensional volume of the subset of the parameter
space for which (4.15) holds is plotted as a function of γ.
CHAPTER 5
ERGODICITY VIA DUALITY
Duality is a valuable tool for finding conditions under which an interacting particle
system is ergodic. We will focus on what is known as annihilating duality because that is
the type of duality that works best for ΩB.
5.1 Duality for ΩB
We begin with the case of ΩB, reviewing certain results of Ethier and Lee [8]. Recall
that p0, p1, p2, p3 ∈ [0, 1] are the parameters of the process, Σ := {0, 1}Z is the state space,





for all f ∈ C(Σ) depending on only finitely many coordinates, where ηx is the configuration
that differs from η only ar x,
c(x, η) :=
{
pmx(η) if η(x) = 0,
qmx(η) if η(x) = 1,
(5.1)
qm := 1− pm for m = 0, 1, 2, 3, and mx(η) := 2η(x− 1) + η(x+ 1) ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
The state space of the dual process is the countable set Y := {A ⊂ Z∪{∞} : A is finite}.
(Here, A is a finite set having nothing to do with game A or game A′.) The duality function
to which we will restrict attention is defined on Σ× Y by
H2(η,A) =
{∏
x∈A∩Z[2η(x)− 1] = (−1)|{x∈A∩Z:η(x)=0}| if ∞ /∈ A,
−∏x∈A∩Z[2η(x)− 1] = −(−1)|{x∈A∩Z:η(x)=0}| if ∞ ∈ A,
where η ∈ X and A ∈ Y . The result of Liggett [15] that we will use here is originally due
to Holley and Stroock [13].






defined for all f ∈ C(Σ) depending only on finitely many coordinates. If the flip rates












where c(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ Z, supx∈Z c(x) < ∞, p(x,A) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ Z and A ∈ Y ,∑
A∈Y p(x,A) = b(x) ≤ 1 for all x ∈ Z, and supx∈Z c(x)
∑












p(x, F ) ≥ 0, B 6= A,
and V (A) :=
∑
x∈A∩Z c(x)[1−b(x)] ≥ 0. This establishes that the spin system with generator
Ω2 and the jump process with infinitesimal matrix q2 are in duality with respect to H2. If,
in addition, infx∈Z c(x)[1− b(x)] > 0, then the spin system is ergodic.
Remark. The nonegativity assumption on p(x,A) is not a serious restriction because the
sign of H2(η,A) changes when ∞ is added to the finite set A ⊂ Z.
Since our flip rates (5.1) are translation invariant [meaning c(x, η) = c(x + 1, η(· − 1))]
and nearest neighbor [meaning c(x, η) depends only on η(x−1), η(x), and η(x+1)], there are
nine parameters necessary to specify (5.2), namely c(0) = c(x) and p(0, A) = p(x, x+A) as
A ranges over the eight subsets of {−1, 0, 1} and furthermore each such A may be augmented
by including ∞. The basic requirement of our spin system is that c(x, η) + c(x, ηx) = 1 for
all η ∈ Σ and x ∈ Z, and this implies that three of the eight probabilities are 0 (namely,
the ones corresponding to A ∩ Z = {−1, 0}, A ∩ Z = {0, 1}, and A ∩ Z = {−1, 0, 1}) and






























































and the latter sum must be 0 for the result to be constant in η.
This leaves five remaining parameters, which we will denote by z∅, z−1, z0, z1, and z−1,1,
the interpretation being that zA = p(0, A) if zA ≥ 0 and zA = −p(0, A ∪ {∞}) if zA < 0.
They must satisfy
2−1(1− z0)−1(1 + z∅ − z−1 − z0 − z1 + z−1,1) = p0,
2−1(1− z0)−1(1 + z∅ − z−1 − z0 + z1 − z−1,1) = p1,
2−1(1− z0)−1(1 + z∅ + z−1 − z0 − z1 − z−1,1) = p2,
2−1(1− z0)−1(1 + z∅ + z−1 − z0 + z1 + z−1,1) = p3,
(5.3)
where (1 − z0)−1 is c(0) and the coefficient of each zA is −1 raised to the number of 0s
in A when (η(−1), η(0), η(1)) = (0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0), and (1, 0, 1), respectively. The
corresponding equations for η(0) = 1 are
2−1(1− z0)−1(1− z∅ + z−1 − z0 + z1 − z−1,1) = q0,
2−1(1− z0)−1(1− z∅ + z−1 − z0 − z1 + z−1,1) = q1,
2−1(1− z0)−1(1− z∅ − z−1 − z0 + z1 + z−1,1) = q2,
2−1(1− z0)−1(1− z∅ − z−1 − z0 − z1 − z−1,1) = q3,
If there is a solution of (5.3) with
|z∅|+ |z−1|+ |z0|+ |z1|+ |z−1,1| < 1, (5.4)
this ensures the ergodicity of the spin system.
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The linear system is underdetermined, and a solution to (5.3) is given by
z∅ = (p0 + p1 + p2 + p3 − 2)(1− z0)/2,
z−1 = −(p0 + p1 − p2 − p3)(1− z0)/2,
z1 = −(p0 − p1 + p2 − p3)(1− z0)/2,
z−1,1 = (p0 − p1 − p2 + p3)(1− z0)/2,
(5.5)
in which case (5.4) reduces to, if 0 ≤ z0 < 1,
1
2
(|p0 + p1 + p2 + p3 − 2|+ |p0 + p1 − p2 − p3|
+ |p0 − p1 + p2 − p3|+ |p0 − p1 − p2 + p3|)(1− z0) + z0 < 1, (5.6)
which holds if and only if it holds for z0 = 0. Replacing |p0+p1−p2−p3| by (p0+p1−p2−p3)
and −(p0 + p1 − p2 − p3), and similarly for the other three terms, we get 16 inequalities,
which are jointly equivalent to
p0, p1, p2, p3 ∈ (2p− 1, 2p) ∩ (0, 1), p := (p0 + p1 + p2 + p3)/4.
The 4-dimensional volume of this region is 2/3. We have just rederived, with a little more
detail, a result of Ethier and Lee (2013a).
5.2 Duality for ΩA′

















1− η(x) if y = x,
η(y) if y 6= x, xηx+1(y) :=

η(x+ 1) if y = x,
η(x) if y = x+ 1,
η(y) otherwise.
Because of the second sum in (5.7), this is not the generator of a spin system (because the
spin may change at more than one coordinate at a time). Therefore, the duality method
of the preceding section does not apply directly. Nevertheless, there may still be a jump
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Markov process in Y that is dual to our interacting particle system with respect to the
function H2. That is what we investigate in this section.





Recalling that c2 involves nine unknown parameters and there are eight equations (for the






1 + [2η(x)− 1][2η(x+ 1)− 1]
2
+




























which, for 0 ≤ z0 < 1, is of the form (5.2) with c(x) = 1, p(x, {x − 1,∞}) = 12 , p(x, {x +
1,∞}) = 12 , and p(x,A) = 0 otherwise. Thus b(x) = 1 and the sufficient condition for
ergodicity fails, at least for this component of the generator by itself. That is not a concern
because we are interested in ΩA′ only for the role it plays in ΩC′ := γΩA′ + (1− γ)ΩB.










H2(η,A) if x, x+ 1 ∈ A or if x, x+ 1 /∈ A,












x∈Z:x∈A, x+1/∈A or x/∈A, x+1∈A
−2H2(η,A)
= −|{x ∈ Z : x ∈ A, x+ 1 /∈ A or x /∈ A, x+ 1 ∈ A}|H2(η,A)
= −V2(A)H2(η,A)
for all η ∈ Σ and A ∈ Y . Here V2(A) = 0 if A = ∅ or A = {∞}, but otherwise V2(A) ≥ 2.
This fits into the duality framework with q2(A,B) = 0 for all A,B ∈ Y .
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5.3 Duality for ΩC ′ := γΩA′ + (1− γ)ΩB
Now we put our results together. Because the exclusion process part does not contribute
to the jump rates of the dual process in Y , we need only consider the spin system parts.
These have flip rates in the mixed generator ΩC′ equal to







































































using (5.2) and (5.8) but with the quantities zA as in (5.5). The condition (5.4) for ergodicity
becomes, if 0 ≤ z0 < 1,
1 > |(1− γ)z∅|+ | − γ(1− z0)/2 + (1− γ)z−1|+ | − γ(1− z0)/2 + (1− γ)z1|




{(1− γ)|p0 + p1 + p2 + p3 − 2|
+ |(1− γ)(p0 + p1 − p2 − p3) + γ|
+ |(1− γ)(p0 − p1 + p2 − p3) + γ|
+ (1− γ)|p0 − p1 − p2 + p3|}(1− z0) + z0, (5.9)
As in (5.6), this holds if and only if it holds for z0 = 0. Our sufficient condition for ergodicity
is
(1− γ)|p0 + p1 + p2 + p3 − 2|+ |(1− γ)(p0 + p1 − p2 − p3) + γ|
+ |(1− γ)(p0 − p1 + p2 − p3) + γ|+ (1− γ)|p0 − p1 − p2 + p3| < 2. (5.10)
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We have proved the following theorem.
Theorem 5.2. The interacting particle system in Σ := {0, 1}Z with generator ΩC′ :=
γΩA′ + (1− γ)ΩB, where 0 < γ < 1, is ergodic if (5.10) holds.
To see that this is an improvement over the result of Chapter 4, take γ = 1/2. Then
the 4-dimensional volume of the region where the inequality is satisfied is equal to 11/12.
If p1 = p2, the 3-dimensional volume of the region where the inequality is satisfied is equal
to 5/6.
We continue to assume that γ = 1/2, so it is actually the union of the two parameter
sets (the one from the basic inequality and the one from duality) that is relevant. Its
4-dimensional volume could not be determined, but, assuming p1 = p2, its 3-dimensional
volume is, from Mathematica, 7/8:
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Of the six examples studied in Chapter 3, only three belong to this union.
CHAPTER 6
CONVERGENCE OF MEANS
We would like to prove that limN→∞ µN(γ,1−γ)′ and limN→∞ µ
N
[r,s]′ exist under certain
conditions, where µN(γ,1−γ)′ denotes the mean profit per turn at equilibrium to the N players
playing the (γ, 1 − γ) random mixture of games A′ and B (the Parrondo games of Xie
and others [21]), and µN[r,s]′ denotes the mean profit per turn at equilibrium to the N
players playing games A′ and B in the nonrandom periodic pattern A′, A′, . . . , A′ (r times),
B,B, . . . , B (s times), A′, A′, . . . , A′ (r times), B,B, . . . , B (s times), etc. The first result is
relatively straightforward, while the second requires more work. The key step for the second
result is to prove that the sequence of discrete generators converges to the generator of an
interacting particle system. We treat the simple case of r = s = 1 first, then r = s = 2, and
finally the general case.
6.1 Convergence of means in
random mixture case
We want to show that our sequence of discrete-time Markov chains, suitably rescaled,
converges in distribution to an interacting particle system on Z. The limiting process is
characterized in terms of its generator. First, we need to define generators corresponding
to game A′, game B, and game C ′. The state space is
Σ := {0, 1}Z = {η = (. . . , η(−2), η(−1), η(0), η(1), η(2), . . .) : η(i) ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ Z}.
For η ∈ Σ and x ∈ Z define ηx,−1 and ηx,1 to be the elements of Σ given by
ηx,−1(y) :=

1 if y = x− 1,




0 if y = x,
1 if y = x+ 1,
η(y) otherwise.
For example, η0,1 := (. . . , η(−2), η(−1), 0, 1, η(2), η(3), . . .). And let ηx be the element of Σ



























































γΩA′f + (1− γ)ΩBf
]
(η) (6.3)
for functions f ∈ C(Σ) depending on only finitely many coordinates, where
c(x, η) :=
{
pmx(η) if η(x) = 0,
qmx(η) if η(x) = 1,
(6.4)
qm := 1− pm for m = 0, 1, 2, 3, and mx(η) := 2η(x− 1) + η(x+ 1) ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
Next, it is necessary to be shown that this interacting particle system is the limit in
distribution of the N -player model as N → ∞. Furthermore, we need to adjust the state
space by relabeling the players. Specifically, we let




−(N − 1)/2 if N is odd,
−N/2 if N is even, rN :=
{
(N − 1)/2 if N is odd,
N/2− 1 if N is even.
It should be noted that players lN and rN are nearest neighbors. We denote the Markov
chain in ΣN by {XNk , k = 0, 1, 2, . . .}.
First, let us analyze game A′. The one-step transition matrix PA′ of the Markov chain























where δ(η, ξ) is the Kronecker delta, which is 1 if η = ξ and is 0 otherwise; the sum over x
ranges over {lN , . . . , rN}, and lN − 1 := rN and rN + 1 := lN . Next, we have the one-step











where the sum over y also ranges over {lN , . . . , rN}; c(y, ξ) is as in (6.4), except that
lN − 1 := rN and rN + 1 := lN . In addition, ξy is equal to ξ except at the yth coordinate.
We speed up time in the N -player model so that N one-step transitions occur per unit
of time. Then the discrete generator corresponding to game A′ is
(ΩNA′f)(η) = NE
[






































The discrete generator corresponding to game B is
(ΩNB f)(η) = NE
[





































Hence the discrete generator corresponding to game C ′ is
(ΩNC′f)(η) =
[






























We define ψN : B(Σ) 7→ B(ΣN ) by
(ψNf)(η(lN ), . . . , η(rN )) := f(. . . , 1, 1, η(lN ), . . . , η(rN ), 1, 1, . . .). (6.8)
Lemma 6.1. If f ∈ C(Σ) depends on η only through the 2K + 1 components η(x) for
−K ≤ x ≤ K, then
(ΩNA′ψNf)(η) = ψN (ΩA′f)(η), (6.9)
(ΩNBψNf)(η) = ψN (ΩBf)(η), (6.10)
and
(ΩNC′ψNf)(η) = ψN (ΩC′f)(η) (6.11)
for all η ∈ ΣN and N ≥ 2K + 4.






f(. . . , 1, 1, ηx,−1, 1, 1, . . .) +
1
2
f(. . . , 1, 1, ηx,1, 1, 1, . . .)− f(. . . , 1, 1, η, 1, 1, . . .)
]
,





f((. . . , 1, 1, η, 1, 1, . . .)x,−1) +
1
2
f((. . . , 1, 1, η, 1, 1, . . .)x,1)− f(. . . , 1, 1, η, 1, 1, . . .)
]
,
where again η ∈ ΣN .
If lN+1 ≤ x ≤ rN−1, then we have f(. . . , 1, 1, ηx,−1, 1, 1 . . .) = f((. . . , 1, 1, η, 1, 1 . . .)x,−1)
and f(. . . , 1, 1, ηx,1, 1, 1 . . .) = f((. . . , 1, 1, η, 1, 1 . . .)x,1). Thus a sufficient condition for (6.9)
is that K ≤ rN − 1 and −K ≥ lN + 1. Equivalently, it suffices that
K ≤ min(rN − 1,−lN − 1) = rN − 1 =
{
(N − 1)/2− 1 if N is odd,
N/2− 2 if N is even.
Therefore it suffices that N ≥ 2K + 3 if N is odd, while N ≥ 2K + 4 if N is even. Hence,
N ≥ 2K + 4 is certainly sufficient. Similarly, we can prove (6.10) and (6.11).
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Lemma 6.1 implies that the process {XNbNtc} converges in distribution to the interacting
particle system {Xt} by Theorem 1.6.5 and 4.2.6 of Ethier and Kurtz [4]. It also implies
that, if the interacting particle system has a unique stationary distribution, then the unique
stationary distribution of the N -player Markov chain converges to it in the topology of
weak convergence, essentially by Proposition I.2.14 of Liggett [15]. Let us assume that
the interacting particle system with generator ΩC′ has a unique stationary distribution pi,
and let us denote the unique stationary distribution of the N -player Markov chain for the
(γ, 1− γ) random mixture of games A′ and B by piN . (We previously denoted the latter by
pi but now it is necessary to make the dependence on N explicit.) We do not use boldface
for piN or pi because it is no longer useful or possible, respectively, to think of them as row
vectors.) Let us denote their −1, 1 two-dimensional marginals by piN−1,1 and pi−1,1. Then we
have
µN(γ,1−γ)′
= piN−1,1(0, 0)(2p0 − 1) + piN−1,1(0, 1)(2p1 − 1) + piN−1,1(1, 0)(2p2 − 1) + piN−1,1(1, 1)(2p3 − 1)
→ pi−1,1(0, 0)(2p0 − 1) + pi−1,1(0, 1)(2p1 − 1) + pi−1,1(1, 0)(2p2 − 1) + pi−1,1(1, 1)(2p3 − 1)
=: µ(γ,1−γ)′ , (6.12)
hence µN(γ,1−γ)′ , the mean profit per turn at equilibrium to the N players playing the (γ, 1−γ)
random mixture of games A′ and B, converges as N →∞ to a limit that can be expressed
in terms of an interacting particle system. We have proved the following.
Theorem 6.2. Fix γ ∈ (0, 1). Assume that the interacting particle system on Z with
generator ΩC′ := γΩA′ + (1− γ)ΩB is ergodic with unique stationary distribution pi. Then
limN→∞ µN(γ,1−γ)′ = µ(γ,1−γ)′, where µ(γ,1−γ)′ is as in (6.12).
6.2 Convergence of generators:
Case of r = s = 1
We will need PA′(η, ξ), PB(ξ, ζ), and (PA′PB)(η, ζ) before we evaluate (Ω
N
[1,1]′f)(η),
where the discrete generator ΩN[1,1]′ corresponds to the nonrandom pattern [1, 1]
′, that is,
A′BA′BA′B · · · , and with N games played per unit of time.
The state space is





−(N − 1)/2 if N is odd,
−N/2 if N is even, rN :=
{
(N − 1)/2 if N is odd,
N/2− 1 if N is even.
For x = lN , . . . , rN , let η
x,1 be the element of ΣN whose yth component is equal to η(y)
if y 6= x, x + 1, 0 if y = x, 1 if y = x + 1; let ηx,−1 be the element of ΣN whose yth
component is equal to η(y) if y 6= x, x − 1, 0 if y = x, 1 if y = x − 1. For example,
η0,1 := (η(lN ), . . . , η(−1), 0, 1, η(2), . . . , η(rN )). Note that rN + 1 := lN and lN − 1 := rN
here, since players lN and rN are nearest neighbors.








δ(ηx,−1, ξ) + δ(ηx,1, ξ)
]
,
where δ(η, ξ) is the Kronecker delta, which is 1 if η = ξ and is 0 otherwise; the sum over x











where the sum over y also ranges over {lN , . . . , rN}; c(y, ξ) is equal to pmy(ξ) if ξ(y) = 0
and is equal to qmy(ξ) if ξ(y) = 1; here qm := 1 − pm for m = 0, 1, 2, 3 and my(ξ) :=
2ξ(y− 1) + ξ(y+ 1) ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. In addition, ξy is equal to ξ except at the yth component.












































(1− c(y, ξ))δ(ηx,−1, ξ)δ(ξ, ζ) + (1− c(y, ξ))δ(ηx,1, ξ)δ(ξ, ζ)
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c(y, ηx,−1)δ((ηx,−1)y, ζ) + c(y, ηx,1)δ((ηx,1)y, ζ)
]
. (6.13)




















c(y, ηx,−1)[f((ηx,−1)y)− f(η)] + c(y, ηx,1)[f((ηx,1)y)− f(η)]
]
. (6.14)
Now suppose that f ∈ B(Σ) depends only on η(−(K−2)), . . . , η(K−2) for some integer






















































































[|fN (ηx,−1)− fN (η)|+ |fN (ηx,1)− fN (η)|]
≤ (2K + 1)2 sup
η,x
[∣∣fN (ηx,−1)− fN (η)∣∣+ ∣∣fN (ηx,1)− fN (η)∣∣]
≤ 4(2K + 1)2 sup
η
∣∣f(η)∣∣.
The fifth term becomes O(N−1) in the same way as the first term.
Since |x| > K in the third term, fN (ηx,−1) = fN (ηx,1) = fN (η). Hence the third term
is zero.
Also |x| > K and |y| > K imply that fN (ηx,−1), fN (ηx,1), fN ((ηx,−1)y), and fN ((ηx,1)y)
are equal to fN (η). This causes the fourth and the eighth terms to be zero.
The second and sixth terms combine because |y| > K implies fN ((ηx,−1)y) = fN (ηx,−1)
and fN ((η
x,1)y) = fN (η





































































fN (ηy)− fN (η)
]
+O(N−1),
where we are also using c(y, ηx,−1) = c(y, η) if |x| > K and |y| ≤ K with possible exceptions
if |x − y| = 1 or 2. But in such a case, fN (ηy) − fN (η) = 0 since f depends only on




































where f ∈ B(Σ) depends on η through the 2K−3 components η(x) for−(K−2) ≤ x ≤ K−2.
Here we recall that ΩA′f and ΩBf are as in (6.1) and (6.2).
6.3 Convergence of generators:
Case of r = s = 2































































(1− c(y, τ))(1− c(z, φ))δ(ηw,−1, ξ)δ(ξx,−1, τ)δ(τ, φ)δ(φ, ζ)
+ (1− c(y, τ))c(z, φ)δ(ηw,−1, ξ)δ(ξx,−1, τ)δ(τ, φ)δ(φz, ζ)
+ c(y, τ)(1− c(z, φ))δ(ηw,−1, ξ)δ(ξx,−1, τ)δ(τy, φ)δ(φ, ζ)
+ c(y, τ)c(z, φ)δ(ηw,−1, ξ)δ(ξx,−1, τ)δ(τy, φ)δ(φz, ζ)
+ (1− c(y, τ))(1− c(z, φ))δ(ηw,−1, ξ)δ(ξx,1, τ)δ(τ, φ)δ(φ, ζ)
+ (1− c(y, τ))c(z, φ)δ(ηw,−1, ξ)δ(ξx,1, τ)δ(τ, φ)δ(φz, ζ)
+ c(y, τ)(1− c(z, φ))δ(ηw,−1, ξ)δ(ξx,1, τ)δ(τy, φ)δ(φ, ζ)
+ c(y, τ)c(z, φ)δ(ηw,−1, ξ)δ(ξx,1, τ)δ(τy, φ)δ(φz, ζ)
+ (1− c(y, τ))(1− c(z, φ))δ(ηw,1, ξ)δ(ξx,−1, τ)δ(τ, φ)δ(φ, ζ)
+ (1− c(y, τ))c(z, φ)δ(ηw,1, ξ)δ(ξx,−1, τ)δ(τ, φ)δ(φz, ζ)
+ c(y, τ)(1− c(z, φ))δ(ηw,1, ξ)δ(ξx,−1, τ)δ(τy, φ)δ(φ, ζ)
+ c(y, τ)c(z, φ)δ(ηw,1, ξ)δ(ξx,−1, τ)δ(τy, φ)δ(φz, ζ)
+ (1− c(y, τ))(1− c(z, φ))δ(ηw,1, ξ)δ(ξx,1, τ)δ(τ, φ)δ(φ, ζ)
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+ (1− c(y, τ))c(z, φ)δ(ηw,1, ξ)δ(ξx,1, τ)δ(τ, φ)δ(φz, ζ)
+ c(y, τ)(1− c(z, φ))δ(ηw,1, ξ)δ(ξx,1, τ)δ(τy, φ)δ(φ, ζ)














(1− c(y, (ηw,−1)x,−1))(1− c(z, (ηw,−1)x,−1))δ((ηw,−1)x,−1, ζ)
+ (1− c(y, (ηw,−1)x,−1))c(z, (ηw,−1)x,−1)δ(((ηw,−1)x,−1)z, ζ)
+ c(y, (ηw,−1)x,−1)(1− c(z, ((ηw,−1)x,−1)y))δ(((ηw,−1)x,−1)y, ζ)
+ c(y, (ηw,−1)x,−1)c(z, ((ηw,−1)x,−1)y)δ((((ηw,−1)x,−1)y)z, ζ)
+ (1− c(y, (ηw,−1)x,1))(1− c(z, (ηw,−1)x,1))δ((ηw,−1)x,1, ζ)
+ (1− c(y, (ηw,−1)x,1))c(z, (ηw,−1)x,1)δ(((ηw,−1)x,1)z, ζ)
+ c(y, (ηw,−1)x,1)(1− c(z, ((ηw,−1)x,1)y))δ(((ηw,−1)x,1)y, ζ)
+ c(y, (ηw,−1)x,1)c(z, ((ηw,−1)x,1)y)δ((((ηw,−1)x,1)y)z, ζ)
+ (1− c(y, (ηw,1)x,−1))(1− c(z, (ηw,1)x,−1))δ((ηw,1)x,−1, ζ)
+ (1− c(y, (ηw,1)x,−1))c(z, (ηw,1)x,−1)δ(((ηw,1)x,−1)z, ζ)
+ c(y, (ηw,1)x,−1)(1− c(z, ((ηw,1)x,−1)y))δ(((ηw,1)x,−1)y, ζ)
+ c(y, (ηw,1)x,−1)c(z, ((ηw,1)x,−1)y)δ((((ηw,1)x,−1)y)z, ζ)
+ (1− c(y, (ηw,1)x,1))(1− c(z, (ηw,1)x,1))δ((ηw,1)x,1, ζ)
+ (1− c(y, (ηw,1)x,1))c(z, (ηw,1)x,1)δ(((ηw,1)x,1)z, ζ)
+ c(y, (ηw,1)x,1)(1− c(z, ((ηw,1)x,1)y))δ(((ηw,1)x,1)y, ζ)
+ c(y, (ηw,1)x,1)c(z, ((ηw,1)x,1)y)δ((((η
w,1)x,1)y)z, ζ). (6.16)
Next, assume that f ∈ B(Σ) depends only on η(−(K−2)), . . . , η(K−2) for some integer
K ≥ 2, and put fN := ψNf ∈ B(ΣN ). Then the discrete generator with r = s = 2 acting














(1− c(y, (ηw,−1)x,−1))(1− c(z, (ηw,−1)x,−1))
· [fN ((ηw,−1)x,−1)− fN (η)]
+ (1− c(y, (ηw,−1)x,−1))c(z, (ηw,−1)x,−1)[fN (((ηw,−1)x,−1)z)− fN (η)]
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+ (1− c(y, (ηw,−1)x,1))(1− c(z, (ηw,−1)x,1))[fN ((ηw,−1)x,1)− fN (η)]
+ (1− c(y, (ηw,−1)x,1))c(z, (ηw,−1)x,1)[fN (((ηw,−1)x,1)z)− fN (η)]










+ (1− c(y, (ηw,1)x,−1))(1− c(z, (ηw,1)x,−1))[fN ((ηw,1)x,−1)− fN (η)]
+ (1− c(y, (ηw,1)x,−1))c(z, (ηw,1)x,−1)[fN (((ηw,1)x,−1)z)− fN (η)]










+ (1− c(y, (ηw,1)x,1))(1− c(z, (ηw,1)x,1))[fN ((ηw,1)x,1)− fN (η)]
+ (1− c(y, (ηw,1)x,1))c(z, (ηw,1)x,1)[fN (((ηw,1)x,1)z)− fN (η)]








































and conclude the following.
• The term for which all of |w|, |x|, |y|, and |z| are less than or equal to K contribute
at most (16N3)−1(2K + 1)4 2 supη |f(η)|.
• The terms for which three of |w|, |x|, |y|, and |z| are less than or equal to K contribute
at most 4(16N3)−1(N − (2K + 1))(2K + 1)3 2 supη |f(η)|.
• The terms for which two of |w|, |x|, |y|, and |z| are less than or equal to K contribute
at most 6(16N3)−1(N − (2K + 1))2(2K + 1)2 2 supη |f(η)|.
• The term for which none of |w|, |x|, |y|, and |z| is less than or equal to K is equal to
0.
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The contributions to (6.17) described in the four cases above will be O(N−1). So it is
enough to analyze the cases in which one of |w|, |x|, |y|, and |z| is less than or equal to K.













(1− c(y, (ηw,−1)x,−1))(1− c(z, (ηw,−1)x,−1))
· [fN (ηw,−1)− fN (η)]
+ (1− c(y, (ηw,−1)x,−1))c(z, (ηw,−1)x,−1)[fN (ηw,−1)− fN (η)]










+ (1− c(y, (ηw,−1)x,1))(1− c(z, (ηw,−1)x,1))[fN (ηw,−1)− fN (η)]
+ (1− c(y, (ηw,−1)x,1))c(z, (ηw,−1)x,1)[fN (ηw,−1)− fN (η)]










+ (1− c(y, (ηw,1)x,−1))(1− c(z, (ηw,1)x,−1))[fN (ηw,1)− fN (η)]
+ (1− c(y, (ηw,1)x,−1))c(z, (ηw,1)x,−1)[fN (ηw,1)− fN (η)]










+ (1− c(y, (ηw,1)x,1))(1− c(z, (ηw,1)x,1))[fN (ηw,1)− fN (η)]
+ (1− c(y, (ηw,1)x,1))c(z, (ηw,1)x,1)[fN (ηw,1)− fN (η)]













































































(1− c(y, η))(1− c(z, η))[fN (η)− fN (η)]
+ (1− c(y, η))c(z, η))[fN (η)− fN (η)]
+ c(y, η)(1− c(z, ηy)
[
fN (ηy)− fN (η)
]
+ c(y, η)c(z, ηy)
[
fN (ηy)− fN (η)
]
+ (1− c(y, η))(1− c(z, η))[fN (η)− fN (η)]
+ (1− c(y, η))c(z, η)[fN (η)− fN (η)]
+ c(y, η)(1− c(z, ηy))
[
fN (ηy)− fN (η)
]
+ c(y, η)c(z, ηy)
[
fN (ηy)− fN (η)
]
+ (1− c(y, η))(1− c(z, η))[fN (η)− fN (η)]
+ (1− c(y, η))c(z, η)[fN (η)− fN (η)]
+ c(y, η)(1− c(z, ηy))
[
fN (ηy)− fN (η)
]
+ c(y, η)c(z, ηy)
[
fN (ηy)− fN (η)
]
+ (1− c(y, η))(1− c(z, η))[fN (η)− fN (η)]
+ (1− c(y, η))c(z, η)[fN (η)− fN (η)]
+ c(y, η)(1− c(z, ηy))
[
fN (ηy)− fN (η)
]
+ c(y, η)c(z, ηy))
[































fN (ηy)− fN (η)
]
+O(N−1), (6.19)
where we are also using, for example, c(y, (ηw,−1)x,−1) = c(y, η) if |w| > K, |x| > K, and
|y| ≤ K with possible exceptions if |w − y| = 1 or 2 or |x − y| = 1 or 2. But in such a























































































6.4 Convergence of generators: General case
The discrete generator for the nonrandom periodic pattern (A′)rBs has the form, for







[f(ηr+s)− f(η0)](P rA′P sB)(η0, ηr+s).










1, η2) · · ·PA′(ηr−1, ηr)






































































































































c(xj , ((· · · ((· · · (((η0)x1,a1)x2,a2) · · · )xp,ap) · · · )xr,ar){xl:l∈B,l<j})
× δ(((· · · ((· · · (((η0)x1,a1)x2,a2) · · · )xp,ap) · · · )xr,ar){xl:l∈B}, ηr+s), (6.20)




−1 if p ∈ Ac,
1 if p ∈ A.
Here, for example, η{xl:l∈B} denotes η with the spins flipped at each site xl with l ∈ B.
These site labels need not be distinct, so if there are multiple flips at a single site, only the
parity of the number of flips is relevant.
Next, assume that f ∈ B(Σ) depends only on η(−(K−2)), . . . , η(K−2) for some integer
K ≥ 2, and put fN := ψNf ∈ B(ΣN ). Then the discrete generator for the pattern (A′)rBs,





























c(xj , ((· · · ((· · · (((η0)x1,a1)x2,a2) · · · )xp,ap) · · · )xr,ar){xl:l∈B,l<j})





























|xi|>K resulting in 2
r+s multiple sums in
which each of those multiple sums with two or more sums of the form
∑
|xi|≤K contributes
at most O(N−1) and those without the form
∑
|xi|≤K , where i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} ∪B are 0. So
it is enough to analyze the cases in which only one of the |xi|’s is less than or equal to K.






















































































































































































1− c(xj , (· · · ((· · · (((η0)x1,a1)x2,a2) · · · )xp,ap) · · · )xr,ar)
+ c(xj , (· · · ((· · · (((η0)x1,a1)x2,a2) · · · )xp,ap) · · · )xr,ar)
]
= [N − (2K + 1)]r+s−1,




















































































































N − (2K + 1)]r+s−1s ∑
|x|≤K
c(x, η0)[fN ((η













where the first and second equalities require clarification.











c(xj , ((· · · ((· · · (((η0)x1,a1)x2,a2) · · · )xp,ap) · · · )xr,ar){xl:l∈B,l<j}) = c(xj , η0)
with possible exceptions if
{xj − 1, xj , xj + 1} ∩
[ ⋃
p∈Ac
{xp, xp − 1} ∪
⋃
p∈A






That excludes at most 4r + 3s of the N possible values of xj , hence involves an error of at


















1− c(xj , η0) + c(xj , η0)
]
= [N − (2K + 1)]r+s−1.













6.5 Convergence of means in periodic pattern
Since (6.26) holds, uniformly over ΣN , the unique stationary distribution pi
N of P rA′P
s
B
converges weakly to the unique stationary distribution pir/(r+s) of the interacting particle
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system with generator ΩC′ , provided that ergodicity holds for the limiting interacting








[f(xηx+1)− f(η)] + (1− γ)
∑
x
c(x, η)[f(ηx)− f(η)], (6.27)
where ηx is η except at coordinate x, and
xηx+1(y) :=

η(x+ 1) if y = x,
η(x) if y = x+ 1,
η(y) otherwise,




[1{η(x)=η(x+1)} + 1{η(x)=η(x−1)}] and c(x, η) :=
{
pmx(η) if η(x) = 0,
qmx(η) if η(x) = 1,
where qm := 1− pm for m = 0, 1, 2, 3, and mx(η) := 2η(x− 1) + η(x+ 1) ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Our
aim is to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 6.3. Fix integers r, s ≥ 1 and put γ := r/(r + s). Assume that the interacting
particle system on Z with generator ΩC′ as in (6.27) is ergodic with unique stationary
distribution piγ. Then limN→∞ µN[r,s]′ = µ(γ,1−γ)′, where µ(γ,1−γ)′ is as in (6.12).
Proof. The mean profit per turn to the ensemble of N players playing the nonrandom















[2pmz(η) − 1]. (6.28)






























































































(pir/(r+s))−1,1(k, l)[2p2k+l − 1] + o(1).
So we have, with γ := r/(r + s),





(piγ)−1,1(k, l)[2p2k+l − 1] = µ(γ,1−γ)′ ,
as required.
APPENDIX A
µB AND µC′ FROM MATHEMATICA
This code calculates µB and µC′ for C
′ := 12A
′ + 12B assuming p0 = 0, p1 = p2 = 0.8,
and p3 = 0.5 with 3 ≤ N ≤ 10.
DateList[]
ClearAll[‘‘Global *`’’]
For[n = 3, n ≤ 10, n++, Print[n]; p0=.; p1=.; p2=.; p3=.; q0=.; q1=.; q2=.; q3=.;
group = PermutationGroup[DihedralGroup[n]//GroupGenerators]; (*dihedral group*)
sigma = IntegerDigits[Range[0, 2∧n− 1], 2, n];
Do[permuted[i] = Permute[sigma[[i]], group], {i, 1, 2∧n}];
(*orbitofithelementofSigmaunderG, withduplication*)
Do[digit[x ]:=FromDigits[permuted[i][[x]], 2]; list[i] = Table[digit[x], {x, 1, 2n}],
{i, 1, 2∧n}]; (*setoforbitelementsindecimalform, withduplication*)
class[1] = {0}; (*the first equivalence class*)
num = 1;
For[j = 2, j ≤ 2∧(n− 1), j++,
For[test = 1; k = 1, k ≤ j − 1, k++, If[Sort[list[k]] == Sort[list[j]], test = 0]];
If[test == 1, num = num + 1; class[num] = DeleteDuplicates[Sort[list[j]]]]];
(*generates list of equivalence classes*)
num = num + 1; (*number of equivalence classes*)
class[num] = {2∧n− 1}; (*the last equivalence class*)
For[i = 1, i ≤ num, i++, state[i] = IntegerDigits[class[i], 2, n]];
(*the binary states belonging to equivalence class i*)
For[i = 1, i ≤ num, i++,
ones[i] = (sum = 0; For[k = 1, k ≤ n, k++, If[state[i][[1, k]] == 1, sum+=1]]; sum)];
(*number of ones in each element of equivalence class i*)
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diff[x , y ]:=(sum = 0; For[k = 1, k ≤ n, k++, sum+=Abs[x[[k]]− y[[k]]]]; sum);
(*the Hamming distance between states x and y*)
p[0] = p0; p[1] = p1; p[2] = p2; p[3] = p3; q[0] = q0; q[1] = q1; q[2] = q2; q[3] = q3;
pBbar = ConstantArray[0, {num, num}];
For[i = 1, i ≤ num, i++,
For[j = 1, j ≤ num, j++,
If[i == j, For[k = 1, k ≤ n, k++,
If[state[i][[1, k]] == 1,
If[k == 1, pBbar[[i, j]]+=p[2state[i][[1, n]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n,
If[k == n, pBbar[[i, j]]+=p[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, 1]]]/n,
pBbar[[i, j]]+=p[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n]],
If[k == 1, pBbar[[i, j]]+=q[2state[i][[1, n]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n,
If[k == n, pBbar[[i, j]]+=q[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, 1]]]/n,
pBbar[[i, j]]+=q[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n]]]],
If[ones[j] == ones[i] + 1, For[m = 1,m ≤ Length[class[j]],m++,
If[diff[state[j][[m]], state[i][[1]]] == 1,
For[k = 1, k ≤ n, k++, If[state[j][[m, k]] > state[i][[1, k]],
If[k == 1, pBbar[[i, j]]+=p[2state[i][[1, n]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n,
If[k == n, pBbar[[i, j]]+=p[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, 1]]]/n,
pBbar[[i, j]]+=p[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n]]]]]],
If[ones[j] == ones[i]− 1, For[m = 1,m ≤ Length[class[j]],m++,
If[diff[state[j][[m]], state[i][[1]]] == 1,
For[k = 1, k ≤ n, k++, If[state[j][[m, k]] < state[i][[1, k]],
If[k == 1, pBbar[[i, j]]+=q[2state[i][[1, n]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n,
If[k == n, pBbar[[i, j]]+=q[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, 1]]]/n,
pBbar[[i, j]]+=q[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n]]]]]]]]]]]
pBbardot = ConstantArray[0, {num, num}];
For[i = 1, i ≤ num, i++,
For[j = 1, j ≤ num, j++,
If[i == j, For[k = 1, k ≤ n, k++,
If[state[i][[1, k]] == 1,
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If[k == 1, pBbardot[[i, j]]+=p[2state[i][[1, n]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n,
If[k == n, pBbardot[[i, j]]+=p[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, 1]]]/n,
pBbardot[[i, j]]+=p[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n]],
If[k == 1, pBbardot[[i, j]]-=q[2state[i][[1, n]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n,
If[k == n, pBbardot[[i, j]]-=q[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, 1]]]/n,
pBbardot[[i, j]]-=q[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n]]]],
If[ones[j] == ones[i] + 1, For[m = 1,m ≤ Length[class[j]],m++,
If[diff[state[j][[m]], state[i][[1]]] == 1,
For[k = 1, k ≤ n, k++, If[state[j][[m, k]] > state[i][[1, k]],
If[k == 1, pBbardot[[i, j]]+=p[2state[i][[1, n]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n,
If[k == n, pBbardot[[i, j]]+=p[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, 1]]]/n,
pBbardot[[i, j]]+=p[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n]]]]]],
If[ones[j] == ones[i]− 1,
For[m = 1,m ≤ Length[class[j]],m++,
If[diff[state[j][[m]], state[i][[1]]] == 1,
For[k = 1, k ≤ n, k++, If[state[j][[m, k]] < state[i][[1, k]],
If[k == 1, pBbardot[[i, j]]-=q[2state[i][[1, n]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n,
If[k == n, pBbardot[[i, j]]-=q[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, 1]]]/n,
pBbardot[[i, j]]-=q[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n]]]]]]]]]]]
one = ConstantArray[1, {num, 1}];
pBbardotone = pBbardot.one;
pAbar = ConstantArray[0, {num, num}];
For[i = 1, i ≤ num, i++,
For[j = 1, j ≤ num, j++, If[i == 1, pAbar[[i, i+ 1]] = 1,
If[i == num, pAbar[[i, i− 1]] = 1,
If[ones[j] == ones[i] + 1, For[m = 1,m ≤ Length[class[j]],m++,
If[diff[state[j][[m]], state[i][[1]]] == 1,
For[k = 1, k ≤ n, k++,
If[k < n, If[state[i][[1, k]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]] == 0&&
state[j][[m, k]] + state[j][[m, k + 1]] == 1, pAbar[[i, j]]+=1/(2n)],
If[state[i][[1, k]] + state[i][[1, 1]] == 0&&
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state[j][[m, k]] + state[j][[m, 1]] == 1, pAbar[[i, j]]+=1/(2n)]]]]]];
If[ones[j] == ones[i]− 1, For[m = 1,m ≤ Length[class[j]],m++,
If[diff[state[j][[m]], state[i][[1]]] == 1,
For[k = 1, k ≤ n, k++,
If[k < n, If[state[i][[1, k]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]] == 2&&
state[j][[m, k]] + state[j][[m, k + 1]] == 1, pAbar[[i, j]]+=1/(2n)],
If[state[i][[1, k]] + state[i][[1, 1]] == 2&&
state[j][[m, k]] + state[j][[m, 1]] == 1, pAbar[[i, j]]+=1/(2n)]]]]]];
If[ones[j] == ones[i], For[m = 1,m ≤ Length[class[j]],m++,
If[diff[state[j][[m]], state[i][[1]]] == 0,
For[k = 1, k ≤ n, k++,
If[k < n, If[state[i][[1, k]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]] == 1&&
state[j][[m, k]] + state[j][[m, k + 1]] == 1, pAbar[[i, j]]+=1/(2n)],
If[state[i][[1, k]] + state[i][[1, 1]] == 1&&
state[j][[m, k]] + state[j][[m, 1]] == 1, pAbar[[i, j]]+=1/(2n)]]]];
If[diff[state[j][[m]], state[i][[1]]] == 2,
For[k = 1, k ≤ n, k++,
If[k < n,
If[(state[i][[1, k]] == 0&&state[i][[1, k + 1]] == 1&&state[j][[m, k]] ==
1&&state[j][[m, k + 1]] == 0)‖
(state[i][[1, k]] == 1&&state[i][[1, k + 1]] == 0&&state[j][[m, k]] ==
0&&state[j][[m, k + 1]] == 1), pAbar[[i, j]]+=1/(2n)],
If[(state[i][[1, k]] == 0&&state[i][[1, 1]] == 1&&state[j][[m, k]] ==
1&&state[j][[m, 1]] == 0)‖
(state[i][[1, k]] == 1&&state[i][[1, 1]] == 0&&state[j][[m, k]] ==
0&&state[j][[m, 1]] == 1), pAbar[[i, j]]+=1/(2n)]]]]]]]]]];
p0 = 0; p1 = 0.8; p2 = p1; p3 = 0.5;
q0 = 1− p0; q1 = 1− p1; q2 = 1− p2; q3 = 1− p3;
pi = Array[x, {num}];
solB = Solve[{pi == pi.pBbar, pi.one == 1}, pi];
Print[‘‘muB=’’, N [pi.pBbardotone/.solB]];
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pCbar = (1/2)pAbar + (1/2)pBbar;
pCbardotone = (1/2)pBbardotone;




GRAPH OF PARRONDO REGION FROM
MATHEMATICA
This code sketches graph of Parrondo region assuming p1 = p2 with N = 3, 4.
ClearAll[‘‘Global *`’’]
For[n = 3, n ≤ 4, n++, Print[n];
Print[DateList[]]; p0=.; p1=.; p2=.; p3=.; q0=.; q1=.; q2=.; q3=.;
group = PermutationGroup[DihedralGroup[n]//GroupGenerators]; (*dihedral group*)
sigma = IntegerDigits[Range[0, 2∧n− 1], 2, n];
Do[permuted[i] = Permute[sigma[[i]], group], {i, 1, 2∧n}];
(*orbitofithelementofSigmaunderG, withduplication*)
Do[digit[x ]:=FromDigits[permuted[i][[x]], 2];
list[i] = Table[digit[x], {x, 1, 2n}], {i, 1, 2∧n}];
(*setoforbitelementsindecimalform, withduplication*)
class[1] = {0}; (*the first equivalence class*)
num = 1;
For[j = 2, j ≤ 2∧(n− 1), j++, For[test = 1; k = 1, k ≤ j − 1, k++,
If[Sort[list[k]] == Sort[list[j]], test = 0]];
If[test == 1, num = num + 1; class[num] = DeleteDuplicates[Sort[list[j]]]]];
(*generates list of equivalence classes*)
num = num + 1; (*number of equivalence classes*)
class[num] = {2∧n− 1}; (*the last equivalence class*)
For[i = 1, i ≤ num, i++, state[i] = IntegerDigits[class[i], 2, n]];
(*the binary states belonging to equivalence class i*)
For[i = 1, i ≤ num, i++, ones[i] = (sum = 0;
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For[k = 1, k ≤ n, k++, If[state[i][[1, k]] == 1, sum+=1]]; sum)];
(*number of ones in each element of equivalence class i*)
diff[x , y ]:=(sum = 0; For[k = 1, k ≤ n, k++, sum+=Abs[x[[k]]− y[[k]]]]; sum);
(*the Hamming distance between states x and y*)
p[0] = p0; p[1] = p1; p[2] = p2; p[3] = p3; q[0] = q0; q[1] = q1; q[2] = q2; q[3] = q3;
pBbar = ConstantArray[0, {num, num}];
For[i = 1, i ≤ num, i++, For[j = 1, j ≤ num, j++, If[i == j,
For[k = 1, k ≤ n, k++, If[state[i][[1, k]] == 1,
If[k == 1, pBbar[[i, j]]+=p[2state[i][[1, n]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n,
If[k == n, pBbar[[i, j]]+=p[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, 1]]]/n,
pBbar[[i, j]]+=p[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n]],
If[k == 1, pBbar[[i, j]]+=q[2state[i][[1, n]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n,
If[k == n, pBbar[[i, j]]+=q[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, 1]]]/n,
pBbar[[i, j]]+=q[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n]]]],
If[ones[j] == ones[i] + 1, For[m = 1,m ≤ Length[class[j]],m++,
If[diff[state[j][[m]], state[i][[1]]] == 1,
For[k = 1, k ≤ n, k++, If[state[j][[m, k]] > state[i][[1, k]],
If[k == 1, pBbar[[i, j]]+=p[2state[i][[1, n]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n,
If[k == n, pBbar[[i, j]]+=p[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, 1]]]/n,
pBbar[[i, j]]+=p[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n]]]]]],
If[ones[j] == ones[i]− 1, For[m = 1,m ≤ Length[class[j]],m++,
If[diff[state[j][[m]], state[i][[1]]] == 1,
For[k = 1, k ≤ n, k++, If[state[j][[m, k]] < state[i][[1, k]],
If[k == 1, pBbar[[i, j]]+=q[2state[i][[1, n]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n,
If[k == n, pBbar[[i, j]]+=q[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, 1]]]/n,
pBbar[[i, j]]+=q[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n]]]]]]]]]]]
pBbardot = ConstantArray[0, {num, num}];
For[i = 1, i ≤ num, i++, For[j = 1, j ≤ num, j++,
If[i == j, For[k = 1, k ≤ n, k++, If[state[i][[1, k]] == 1,
If[k == 1, pBbardot[[i, j]]+=p[2state[i][[1, n]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n,
If[k == n, pBbardot[[i, j]]+=p[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, 1]]]/n,
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pBbardot[[i, j]]+=p[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n]],
If[k == 1, pBbardot[[i, j]]-=q[2state[i][[1, n]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n,
If[k == n, pBbardot[[i, j]]-=q[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, 1]]]/n,
pBbardot[[i, j]]-=q[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n]]]],
If[ones[j] == ones[i] + 1, For[m = 1,m ≤ Length[class[j]],m++,
If[diff[state[j][[m]], state[i][[1]]] == 1, For[k = 1, k ≤ n, k++,
If[state[j][[m, k]] > state[i][[1, k]],
If[k == 1, pBbardot[[i, j]]+=p[2state[i][[1, n]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n,
If[k == n, pBbardot[[i, j]]+=p[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, 1]]]/n,
pBbardot[[i, j]]+=p[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n]]]]]],
If[ones[j] == ones[i]− 1, For[m = 1,m ≤ Length[class[j]],m++,
If[diff[state[j][[m]], state[i][[1]]] == 1,
For[k = 1, k ≤ n, k++, If[state[j][[m, k]] < state[i][[1, k]],
If[k == 1, pBbardot[[i, j]]-=q[2state[i][[1, n]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n,
If[k == n, pBbardot[[i, j]]-=q[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, 1]]]/n,
pBbardot[[i, j]]-=q[2state[i][[1, k − 1]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]]]/n]]]]]]]]]]]
one = ConstantArray[1, {num, 1}];
pBbardotone = pBbardot.one;
pAbar = ConstantArray[0, {num, num}];
For[i = 1, i ≤ num, i++, For[j = 1, j ≤ num, j++,
If[i == 1, pAbar[[i, i+ 1]] = 1, If[i == num, pAbar[[i, i− 1]] = 1, If[ones[j] == ones[i] + 1,
For[m = 1,m ≤ Length[class[j]],m++,
If[diff[state[j][[m]], state[i][[1]]] == 1,
For[k = 1, k ≤ n, k++, If[k < n,
If[state[i][[1, k]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]] == 0
&&state[j][[m, k]] + state[j][[m, k + 1]] == 1, pAbar[[i, j]]+=1/(2n)],
If[state[i][[1, k]] + state[i][[1, 1]] == 0
&&state[j][[m, k]] + state[j][[m, 1]] == 1, pAbar[[i, j]]+=1/(2n)]]]]]];
If[ones[j] == ones[i]− 1, For[m = 1,m ≤ Length[class[j]],m++,
If[diff[state[j][[m]], state[i][[1]]] == 1,
For[k = 1, k ≤ n, k++, If[k < n,
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If[state[i][[1, k]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]] == 2
&&state[j][[m, k]] + state[j][[m, k + 1]] == 1, pAbar[[i, j]]+=1/(2n)],
If[state[i][[1, k]] + state[i][[1, 1]] == 2
&&state[j][[m, k]] + state[j][[m, 1]] == 1, pAbar[[i, j]]+=1/(2n)]]]]]];
If[ones[j] == ones[i],
For[m = 1,m ≤ Length[class[j]],m++,
If[diff[state[j][[m]], state[i][[1]]] == 0,
For[k = 1, k ≤ n, k++,
If[k < n, If[state[i][[1, k]] + state[i][[1, k + 1]] == 1
&&state[j][[m, k]] + state[j][[m, k + 1]] == 1, pAbar[[i, j]]+=1/(2n)],
If[state[i][[1, k]] + state[i][[1, 1]] == 1
&&state[j][[m, k]] + state[j][[m, 1]] == 1, pAbar[[i, j]]+=1/(2n)]]]];
If[diff[state[j][[m]], state[i][[1]]] == 2, For[k = 1, k ≤ n, k++,
If[k < n,
If[(state[i][[1, k]] == 0&&state[i][[1, k + 1]] == 1
&&state[j][[m, k]] == 1&&state[j][[m, k + 1]] == 0)
‖(state[i][[1, k]] == 1&&state[i][[1, k + 1]] == 0
&&state[j][[m, k]] == 0&&state[j][[m, k + 1]] == 1), pAbar[[i, j]]+=1/(2n)],
If[(state[i][[1, k]] == 0&&state[i][[1, 1]] == 1
&&state[j][[m, k]] == 1&&state[j][[m, 1]] == 0)
‖(state[i][[1, k]] == 1&&state[i][[1, 1]] == 0&&state[j][[m, k]] == 0
&&state[j][[m, 1]] == 1), pAbar[[i, j]]+=1/(2n)]]]]]]]]]];
p2 = p1;
q0 = 1− p0; q1 = 1− p1; q2 = 1− p2; q3 = 1− p3;
pi = Array[x, {num}];





solC = Solve[{pi == pi.pCbar, pi.one == 1}, pi];
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Print[ContourPlot3D[{muB == 0, muC′ == 0}, {p0, 0, 1}, {p1, 0, 1}, {p3, 0, 1},
AxesLabel→ {Style ["p0 ", Italic, 16] , Style ["p1", Italic, 16] ,
Style [" p3", Italic, 16]} , LabelStyle→ 12,
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